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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the British Army's Royal Regiment 
of Artillery in the Boer War. Through examination of the Army and 
the Regiment before, during and after the war, this narrative seeks 
to demonstrate the conditions of the Regiment before hostilities, its 
employment during the course of selected engagements and the results 
that the war generated regarding the Regiment and its future employ-
ment. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to his major ad-
visor, Dr. Homer L. Knight, for his encouragement and expert assist-
ance throughout this study. Appreciation is also expressed to Dr. 
Odie B. Falk, Dr. Robert M. Spaulding and Dr. Neil J. Hackett for 
their suggestions and assistance in finalizing the narrative. 
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personnel at Oklahoma State University Library, as well as the li-
brarians at Morris T. Swett Technical Library, Fort Sill, Oklahoma 
and the U. s. Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle 
Barracks, Pennsylvania. Their prompt, effici.ent and always courteous 
response to any request greatly aided the author in obtaining the 
materials necessary to research this study. Thanks are also extended 
to Mrs. Ann Smith for the excellence of the final copy, and her valu-
able assistance in completing the study. 
Finally, special gratitude is expressed to my sons, Sean and 
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Colin, who tolerated an absent father, and my wife, Donna, whose 
understanding, encouragement and patience was nothing short of 
monumental. 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
II. ON THE EVE OF WAR 
III. FROM TALANA HILL TO BLACK WEEK. 













The outbreak of the Boer War on October 11, 1899, was the culmina-
tion of nearly a century of hostility between the Dutch emigrants in 
South Africa and the British Government, which acquired possessions in 
South Africa at the end of the Napoleonic War. From the outset neither 
the British nor the Boers seemed willing to abide each other. In 1835, 
after the British began enforcing anti-slavery laws in the Cape Colony, 
the Boers began their "Great Trek, 11 moving north, deeper into the 
interior to avoid the British Government. Later, following the fourth 
Kaffir War, the Boers moved even further north, crossing the Vaal 
River. There in 1852, they established the independent state of Trans-
vaal, and the next year the Orange Free State became the second inde-
pendent Dutch republic. The discovery of diamonds in 1867, along the 
Vaal River, ultimately led to British annexation of Transvaal in 1877, 
and this only added fuel to the smoldering fire. In 1880, some disaf-
fected Boers rose in rebellion against the British rule, and success-
fully fought the British for almost a year. Finally, in 1881, the 
Boers defeated the British at Majuba Hill, and the two Dutch republics 
soon were allowed to become nearly independent of British suzerainty. 
It appeared for the moment things were going to settle down .• 
However, the discovery of gold in 1886, and the subsequent growth 
of the fortune hunting British population searching the gold and dia-
1 
2 
mond fields in Transvaal soon created more difficulty between the Dutch 
republics and Great Britain. The disgruntled British residents of the 
Dutch states, known as Uitlanders, sought a greater voice and partici-
pation in the governmental affairs of the two republics. The Dutch 
fearing, British domination, were unwilling to concede more than seven 
years residency before enfranchisement. This concession, however, made 
no provisions for retroactive residency, and the Uitlanders grew more 
upset with the Boer government. In 1896, a militant group of Uit-
landers attempted to march on Johannesburg. Although easily defeated 
by the Boers, this incident and the sympathetic expression of the dia-
mond baron, Cecil Rhodes, and the British Colonial Minister, Joseph 
Chamberlain, was a warning of things to come. Sensing an impending 
threat, the Dutch governments of Transvaal and the Orange Free State 
began preparations for possible all out war. 
In that year, the Volksraad, the parliamentary body in Transvaal, 
authorized in two resolutions, n2,350,000 for military expenditures. 
Of that amount, n850,000 was specifically earmarked for purchase of 
modern artillery, rifles, ammunition and the construction of fortifi-
cations .• 1 The next three years were spent preparing the reserves for 
possible call to arms, and upgrading and training the national police 
and the Staats Artillery, the only regular military forces available to 
the Boers. 
In April, 1899, the dissatisfied Uitlanders, still pressing for 
1Great Britain, Report .. of l{is Majesty's. Commis.sioners .Appointed to 
Inquire. into the Military. Preparations. and other Matters Connected with 
the War i,n South Africa. (London: His Maj esty1 s Stationery Office, 
1903}-;-p-.-163. [ij:ereinafter cited as Great Britain, Report of His 
Majesty's Commi ssiorters. J 
3 
governmental participation, petitioned the Queen to intervene on their 
behalf to redress enfranchisement, naturalization and dynamite monopoly 
grievances. This generated the final crisis between the British and 
Boers, In the negotiations that followed, neither the Dutch Republics 
nor Great Britain could see eye to eye. By July, the situation was 
becoming more tense. The small British garrisons in the Cape Colony 
and in Natal began preparations to def end the two colonies from possible 
attack by the Dutch republics. Taking up positions along the border, 
the British South African garrison spread its six battalions of infan-
try and two regiments of cavalry at strategic points along the bound-
ary. A station was placed at Ladysmith in Natal, near the Transvaal 
border, to protect the avenue of approach to the port city and railhead 
at Durban. Two other positions were established in the west along the 
railroad which ran through Bechuanaland to Cape Town. One was located 
at Kimberley along the Orange Free State border, and the other was 
placed further north at Mafeking, near the western border of Transvaal. 
The Boers took this action as a threat to their security and 
negotiations were broken off. They irmnediately concentrated on putting 
the two nations on a war footing. The Staats Artillery had already 
received seventy-one of eighty-three new guns that had been ordered 
from European gun-makers. To combine with the Staats Artillery in 
time of war, the Boers had a reserve force which numbered 55,034 
personnel available for duty. They were well armed with either 
4 
Martin-Henry or Mauser rifles of the newest design. 2 
From the British point of view, information from intelligence 
sources clearly indicated that the Boers were preparing to defend their 
nations. There was little doubt that they were f,ully capable of doing 
so by offensive action. At least one of these possible offensive 
thrusts was thought to be planned for Natal, through Van Reenan's Pass 
in the north to Durban on the coast, with the obyious intermediate 
objective at Ladys~ith. 3 By early September, the British had increased 
the garrison in Natal and the Cape Colony by the addition of 10,000 
men in an effort to militarily 11 •••• threaten so long as it was permit-
4 
ted to persu~de. 11 As the tensions rose between the Boers and Great 
Britain, the "threat". was increased until by early October, the 
British had 24,746 regulars present in Natal and the Cape Colony. On 
October 7, the War Office ordered mobilization of 47,000 men, both 
regulars and reservists, with 114 guns for immediate dispatch for C~pe 
Town. General Redevers Buller, a highly respected officer who was 
familiar with South Africa was designated to command the newly mobilized 
field force. 5 
On October 9, 1899, the Dutch Republics of Transvaal and the 
Orange Free State dispatched a joint ultimatum to the British. In it, 
2Ibid., p. 158. "Captain Reichman, the American Military Attache 
with the Boers in his official report dated December, 1900, doubts 
whether more than 35,000 were ever in the field at any one time." 
Ibid., p. 157. [The Boer arsenal was reported in possession of 29,000 
Martin-Henrys and 34,000 Mausers.J 
3Ibid., p. 178. 
4Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of 
Commons), 4th Ser. Vol. LXXVII (17 Oct.-27 Oct~, 1'1899), P• 408. 
5rbid., pp. 412-413. 
they demanded the withdrawal of British forces along their borders 
within forty-eight hours or accept a state of war. Two days later a 
rejection of _the ultimatum was received by the Boers and war was on. 
5 
So began one of the most difficult and frustrating wars in the 
annals of British military history, costing millions of pounds and the 
efforts of more than 400,000 soldiers and sailors before it ended three 
years later. Depicted as the shame of British imperialism, the war 
brought forth immediate criticism from the Continent, the United States 
and within Parliament. However, while criticism from abroad concerning 
the causes of the war was running rampant in the early months of the 
conflict, the Boers were severely testing the British Army. 
Within a week of the outbreak of hostilities, the British garri-
sons at Mafeking and Kimberley were encircled and invested. By 
October 23, the Boers had occupied Dundee and the British withdrew to 
the Ladysmith garrison. One week later, 850 British troops surrendered 
to the Boers at Nicholson's Nek, and this event essentially completed 
the investment of Ladysmith. The next day, October 31, General Buller 
and the first contingent of his field force arrived at Cape Town, but 
the Boers had already seized the strategic offensive. The Briti.sh 
were reeling on their heels trying to stabilize the situation. Public 
opinion at home clamored for the relief of Ladysmith, Kimberley and 
Mafeking, and Buller was tactically limited in his course of action. 
Splitting his force into two main columns, Buller dispatched one 
element toward Ladysmith and 'the other toward Kimberley. The Boers 
employing excellent camouflage and precise sharpshooters, coupled with 
the extreme mobility of their forces took their toll of the British, 
not only in casualties, but also in confidence, morale and esprit de 
corps. Furthermore, the Boer artillery, equipped' wi:th the most recent 
designs in artillery weapons, subjected the British soldier to the 
first prolonged artillery fire he had faced in forty-five years. It 
was a new and frightening experience. To add further to the diffi-
culties, the Royal Regiment of Artillery, the most highly prized of 
British arms, was not performing as well as had been anticipated. On 
the contrary, the Regiment was being consistently out-ranged and out-
maneuvered by the heretofore untested Staats Artillery. 
6 
Reversal followed reversal, and on December 15, 1899, the British 
suffered a smashing defeat at Colenso ending "Black Week," which also 
saw the defeat of British forces at Magersfontein and Stormberg as 
well. The British were stalled along the Madder River in the west and 
the Tugela River in the east. The relief of the besieged garrisons was 
much in doubt at that moment. 
Following closely on the heels of these multiple reverses to the 
British military prestige was the growth of criticism of the Army 1 s ex-
ecution of the war. Almost daily from October to December, 1899, the 
Times published some criticism of the army 1 s performance. With each 
defeat, the criticism mounted and not the least of it was directed at 
the Royal R~giment of Artillery. In an effort to stem the tide of 
criticism and lift the flagging British South African Field Force, 
the War Office on December 18, appointed Lord Roberts of Kandahar as 
Connnander in Chief with Lord Kitchener of Khartoum as his Chief of 
Staff. The Boers, however, had already inflicted a severe blow to the 
prestige of the army and the Royal Regiment, and created a crack in the 
foundation of the security of the British Empire and the home islands. 
It was apparent a unique form of warfare was in the offing in 
South Africa. Frankly, the British Army as a whole and the Royal 
Regiment particularly, had not prepared for war under the conditions 
that existed in South Africa. At the end of the first three months, 
7 
in an effort to cope satisfactorily with the new type of warfare they 
faced, the pragmatic British began modifying and streamlining the Army. 
By February, 1900, they were on the offensive and by June 5, 1900, they 
had occupied the Orange Free State and Transvaal's capital, Pretoria. 
During this period, the Royal Regiment's modifications and jerry-rigged 
interim adaptations not only proved adequate to the task, but also 
exemplified the need for modification. Their changes in material and 
employment made a significant contribution to the reversal of the 
sobering trends of 1899. After the fall of Pretoria, the Regiment 1 s 
participation as gunners decreased as the Boers began a guerrilla war. 
Finally, the Royal Horse and Field Artillery units were formed into 
mounted infantry units in 1901, and they continued to participate in 
the war in that manner until the final peace in May, 1902. 
This study will examine the conduct of the Royal Regiment of 
Artillery in the Boer War from October 1899, to Septemper, 1900, with 
particular attention to its employment and effectiveness. By examining 
the Regiment prior to the war and in selected major engagements during 
this period, this study will determine the contributions it made to the 
British military effort. Finally, this study will illustrate some of 
the changes in tactical philosophy and equipment modifications the 
Royal Regiment effected during the war. 
CHAPTER II 
ON THE EVE OF WAR 
Success in warfare can be attributed to many separate and inter-
related elements. Not the least of these include adequate planning and 
training, tested and improved armaments, suffi~ient manpower and capable 
leadership. On the surface the British Army in 1899 had more than its 
share of all these elements and coupled with its colorful traditions, 
pomp and pageantry enjoyed a prestigious reputation throughout the 
world. However, the difficulties and reversals confronted by the 
British Army in the initial phases of the campaign in South Africa 
demonstrated vividly, built-in and engrained inadequacies in the 
British military system. Along with other shortcomings, these were 
rooted in the conditions of the army's training, planning and equipment 
posture maintained during the decade immediately prior to the outbreak 
of hostilities in October, 1899. 
On the eve of the Boer Wat the British Army and the Royal Regiment 
of Artillery were confined and limited within an environment either 
allowed to exist or created between the years 1888~1899. Such restric-
tions were manifested in outdated and confused mobilization planning, 
small scale training, poor cooperation between combat elements, limited 
tactical and strategic thought, nearly obsolete guns and howitzers for 
the artillery, and manpower limitations. By 1899, the British Army was 
living in the past when rudely shoved into a newer era of warfare in 
8 
1 the "last of the gentlemen I s w~r~." 
I 
The British Empire during the last decade of the nineteenth 
century was gigantic, and its possessions extended around the world. 
The need to provide for its security and defense fell to the navy and 
army. The commercial sea lanes to and from the colonies, Britain's 
economic lifeline, were guarded by the Royal Navy. The army on the 
other hand provided security for the colonies and defense for the home 
islands. This required manpower, but throughout the ten years prior 
to the Boer War, the number of ~en available to carry out the defense 
mission was limited, and thereby, contingency planning was restricted. 
The army's plans were always based on what was on hand, rather than 
what was needed to accomplish the defense task and handle unforeseen 
contingencies. The number of men under arms in the Regular Army in 
1898, for example, was 225,027, while in October, 1899, the British 
2 Army amounted to 249,466. The period from 1898 to the Boer invasion 
of Natal in 1899, was most critical, yet an ino;rease of only 25, 000 
regular forces was allowed. The pattern was similar throughout the 
decade as the military sought to increase forces to adequately perform 
the tasks demanded by the mobilization plans. 
9 
The British mobilization plan was confined to the existing forces, 
1 J. F. C. Fuller, The Last of the Gentlemen's Wars: A Subaltern 1 s 
Journal of the War in. S~h~i-;;;,1899-1902 (London: Faber and 'Fc;1ber, 
Limited, 19 3 7) .-- --· 
2 . The Times (October 16, 1899), p. 11. [Reportedly, the Royal 
Regiment of Artillery consisted of 14,932 men in the Field Artillery, 
3,669 in the Horse Artillery, 1,383 in the Mountain Artillery, and 
the Garrison Artillery numbered 18,326.J Great Britain, Report of His 
Maj esty 1 s Commissioners, p. 33. There was a reserve force of 90:<500 
men available, and beyond that a militia of 129,000. If the situation 
was indeed critical a volunteer yeomanry force of 12,000 was available. 
but more importantly, the scheme remained relatively unchanged after 
its development in 1888. Mobilization planning was a relatively new 
tool in the hands of military authorities, since deployment planning 
had never existed formally, prior to 1886. In the course of that 
10 
year, Major General Henry Brackenbury, Chief of the Intelligence Branch, 
compiled three separate mobilization reports dated April 14, September 
23, and October 14, and presented them to the Army Adjutant-General, 
Lord Wolseley, and the Secretary of State for War, W. H. Smith. They 
directed Brackenbury to chair a committee to carry the study further. 
By December, 1886, portions of the study were completed and submitted. 
The conclusions reached by the committee were that the forces available 
to the Empire could provide two army corps and a line of communication 
for employment abroad. The plan in no way dealt with what the Empire 
should have, but simply involved "what the existing cadres could 
furnish. 113 With this much done, the work lay idle until 1888, when a 
separate Mobilization Section was established and placed under the 
purview of the Adjutant-General's Office. For the next two years the 
section functioned generally without any specific direction and con-
tinued to maintain and imp~ove plans for deployment abroad. 
While this work was being done, it was revealed to Wolseley that 
only two army corps and a portion of a third could be employed for 
home defense. He immediately began seeking a definition of the mission 
of the army from the War Office. A significant shortcoming in the 
planning was the lack of clearly defined priorities in mission. Since 
both forces for deployment abroad and those for home defense were drawn 
3rbid., p. 247. 
11 
from the same source, the inherent manpower limitations demanded that 
the War Office make some decisions. In June 1888, Wolseley recommended 
to the War Office that, along with the two corps for foreign dispatch, 
home defense should consist of three army corps and six brigades of 
4 
cav9:lry. 
Finally, after several months of waiting, F. W. Stanhope, the new 
Secretary of State for War, in December, 1888, issued a memorandum 
which laid down the essential tasks of the army. In essence, it 
stated that the army should do what it could with what it had, and 
still provide full garrisons for the colonies, particularly the naval 
coaling stations, as well as providing the two army corps and part of 
a third for home defense. Stanhope foresaw no threat in Europe, nor 
a probable situation in the colonies that would require the dispatch 
of two army corps. His guidance in the final analysis was that the 
military should organize the forces "sufficiently for the defense of 
this country." Thus, nothing had changed and the army had to perform 
its mission with what was present yet still provide full security for 
h E . 5 t e mpire. 
In February, 1890, using the assumption that "any arrangements 
for home defense helped equally for a foreign expedition, 11 the priority 
objective of mobilization was officially changed to manning the de-
fenses of the home islands, in particular around London. Thus, the 
overseas deployment of two army corps became a secondary task. After 
4Ibid., pp. 247-248. 
5Ibid. 
12 
carefully planning the defenses of the home islands and considerable 
coordination between the Adjutant-General's Office and the War Office, 
it was determined that the minimum force needed to man the defensive 
line was three army corps. The Mobilization Section, again working 
with the numbers that were available, concluded that, still, only two 
full strength army corps and a portion of a third could be raised from 
the Regular Army. This revelation confirmed a critical condition in 
the military, but the Stanhope decision remained in effect as the 
definition of mission and limitation of manpower authorized for the 
6 British 4rmy. By 1894, the new plans were revised to incorporate some 
additional forces, but the needs of the colonies were continuing to 
increase and continental powers were improving and expanding their 
armies as well. 
Noting the build-up of continental armies and the growing tensions 
in Natal, the dape Colony and Egypt, Wolseley in 1896 sought to in-
crease the number of artillery weapons per thousand men in the British 
Army to parity with German and French Armies. The G~rmans and French, 
respectively, had five guns and four and one half guns per thousand 
infantry and cavalry troops. There were 324 guns available in the 
British Army, and to reach parity, an increase of ten batteries or 
sixty guns was necessary, with an additional ten batteries required to 
adequately support the ~eserve Militia Brigades, which at that time 
had no artillery at all. 7 With these estimates in hand, Wolseley ad-
vised Stanhope 1 s successor, the Marquess of Landsdowne, that 11 20 [sic] 
6rbid., p. 247. 
7Ibid., pp. 226-228. 
13 
new batteries should at once be contracted for, 11 and he further urged 
that the War Office recognize five guns per thousand, the same propor-
tion used by the German Army, as 11the standard proportion for our 
8 Army.'' 
Basing his conclusions on the 1888 Stanhope decision, to maintain 
a small land force for dispatch to a foreign theater, and minimizing 
the General's concern regarding any European threat and the tensions 
in the colonies, Landsdowne refused to consider such a costly increase 
as the Commander in Chief demanded. Instead, he asked Wolseley to pro-
vide information concerning the minimum increases in manpower required 
for home defense and the colonies along with reductions in oEher areas 
that would limit the costly additions. These and other specific ques-
tions were asked in view of three assumptions: 
(a) the forces now in Egypt and Natal must continue to be 
regard,~d as temporary, 
(b) the garrison of the Cape will not exceed what is 
necessary for the security of the naval stations, 
(c) no increase to the organised forces available for home 
defence is sanctioned beyond the 3 [sic] Army Corps 
authorised in 1888.9 
Landsdowne's shortsightedness regarding the future needs of the 
forced Wolseley to decrease his demands for forces, and thereby 
pondingly reduced any planning latitude for future contingencies 




In light of his previous request, Wolseley 1 s supplementary proposal 
submitted on October 30, 1896, significantly reduced the number of 
artillery batteries requested. An increase of only seven batteries of 
8Ibid., pp. 228-229. 
9Ibid., pp. 229-232. 
14 
Field and Horse Artillery, a total of forty-two guns and 12,716 person-
10 
nel, was demanded. The following December, Landsdowne recommended 
to the Cabinet that the increases in field artillery were unnecessary, 
but he did concede five battalions of infantry for colonial service 
and 2,722 men for colonial Garrison Artillery companies should be 
. d 11 raifi)e • Nevertheless, over the next two and one half years field 
artillery was increased gradually, until Under Secretary of State for 
War, George Wyndam, announced in March, 1899, that the Regiment amounted 
to 116 guns for the Horse Artillery and 480 guns for the Field Artil-
12 lery. 
The conditions in manpower and planning that existed in 1888, with 
only minor modification created by the increasing tensions in South 
Africa, were relatively unchanged when the Transvaal crisis exploded 
into war in 1899. The mobilization plan hammered out from 1886 through 
1894, was ordered into operation on October 7, 1899, as the threat of 
open war grew. In essence, Great Britain was going to war based on a 
decision made in 1888. 
Spinoffs of contingency planning can be widespread and as a result 
of the Stanhope decision in 1888, tactical and strategic thought shifted 
from coping with colonial guerrilla warfare to emphasis on confronting 
a continental army on the doorstep of the home islands or on the main-
lOibid., p. 236. Hereafter "Horse Artillery" is associated as 
supporting cavalry forces and "Field Artillery" as supporting the 
infantry. Furthermore, "field artillery" is a general term incorporat-
ing both Horse and Field Artilleries to differentiate them from 
"Garrison Artillery." 
11rbid., pp. 240-241. 
12Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Com-
mons), 4th Ser., Vol. LXVII (7 Mar.-20 Mar., 1899), p. 1345. 
15 
land itself. The British Army was rich in experts in guerrilla war 
with such figures as Sir Redevers Buller who served heroically in the 
Zulu Wars in 1879, Lord Roberts of Kandahar who was commander of 
forces in Ireland, and Wolseley who served in Burma and in the Indian 
Mutiny •. Nevertheless, the significance of European warfare overshadowed 
' 
this expertise, and the army seemed more than enthusiastic about the 
study of the great land battles fought during the nineteenth century. 
The last great land war in which Great Britain had participated 
was the Crimean Campaign, ending in 1856. It served as the object 
of considerable study as well as hero worship until the overwhelming 
successes of the Germans in the course of the Franco-Prussian War 
(1870-1871) demonstrated some new and important developments in warfare 
and tactical employment of forces. The importance of coordinated 
effort by all elements committed to an action was clearly portrayed in 
·, 
the war. Before each engagement, the Prussians fired heavy artillery 
preparations while their characteristically widespread and single-line 
skirmishes were being prepared for the assault. These fires were 
directed first at opposing cannon, then shifted to the infantry defense 
line, and finally fell silent when the assault began. The effect was 
devastating. The British accepted the artillery preparation or 
"artillery duel" as an essential step in the attack, but depended on 
13 infantry arrayed in three successive lines as the best employment. 
The successive lines theory constituted the idea of depth of 
forces at a decisive point along the defensive line. The first line 
13Neil Malcolm, ed., The Science of War: 
and Lectures, 189lll903, by the Late Colonel 
c. B. (London: Longmans,Greenj and Company, 
A Collection of Essays 
G: F. R. Henderson, 
1916),-p. 13$ •. 
16 
beat down the enemy's rifle fire and carried to the embattlements. The 
second line, not unlike the Peninsula Campaigns against Napoleon, re-
lied on the cold steel of the bayonet to "bring the battle to a speedy 
conclusion," while the third carried the embattlements and pursued the 
14 beaten enemy. Although the British refused to adopt the Prussian 
infantry formation, the successive line system in conjunction with 
heavy artillery preparatory fires became a tactical axiom. 15 
In addition to alignment of troops, the importance of fire disci-
pline under superior commanders was looked upon as the most effective 
small arms fire. Firing individually on targets of opportunity was 
considered less effective. One of Britain's most highly respected 
military men, Lord Roberts of Kandahar, was among the most vocal spokes-
men for controlled firing, and pointed to the results of the Franco-
Prussian War as evidence of its effectiveness. According to Lord Rob .. 
erts, "good rap~d volleys under the control of a practical commander 
16 
constitute the very essence of military shooting." Further proven by 
the British themselves during the Zulu uprising in 1879, the controlled 
firing principle was an integral part of rifle training throughout the 
British Army. 
The Franco-Prussian War further demonstrated the difficulty and 
costliness of attacking prepared defenses frontally, and gave rise to 
14rbid., pp. 132-133. 
15rbid., p. 162. The difficulties of continuous fire support grew 
from the dependency upon direct fire techniques, which the infantry and 
cavalry reduced by masking the artillery when on the assault. Further-
more, the artillery duel announced the impending assault, and gave the 
enemy the opportunity to ride out the preparatory fires and await their 
eventual silence as the assault began. Until continuous fire support 
could be achieved, the element of surprise was substantially removed by 
the artillery duel. 
16~ ~ (September 23, 1899), p. 6. 
17 
some advocates of defensive tactics rather than bear the cost of the 
ff . 17 o · ens1.ve. Others refused to give up the idea of success through 
offensive action. To escape the destruction of a frontal attack, they 
favored the flank attack as the decisive key to battlefield success. 
To employ flanking maneuvers required speed and mobile reconnaissance. 
Both these elements were found in the cavalry, and the spectacle of. 
cavalry maneuvers was truly an example of the rich tradition and 
pageantry of the British Army. Unfortunately, it was also much more 
and clearly demonstrated the entrenchment of cavalry tactical thought 
in the glories of the past. 
The arme blanche in the 1890 1 s still clung stubbornly to their 
sabres and lances, while disdaining the carbine in their saddle 
scabbard. For the cavalry "shock tactics, the charge and the hand to 
hand encounter" were the essence of its action. Its standards, of 
excellence were embodied in "manoeuvering in great masses, maintaining 
an absolute uniformity of pace and formation, and moving at the 
18 highest speed with accurately dressed ran~s. 11 
I 
The artillery, the third combat element in the British Army, also 
learned important lessons from the Franco-Prussian War. The most 
obvious conclusion from the German example was the overwhelming power 
that coordinated and consolidated artillery fire could generate. This 
was further exemplified by the British themselves during the campaigns 
17 W. H. James, "Modern Weapons 
Organization," Journal of Military 
States, XXVI (1900), pp. 259-272. 
18 Malcolm, p. 50. 
and Their Influence on Tactics and 
Service Institution of the United 
18 
in the Sudan in 1898. 19 To accomplish the massing of fires, artillery 
held in reserve \\!as dropped from practice and all guns available were 
committed to the action. This necessitated that all batteries closely 
accompa.ny the forces they were supporting. In most cases, particularly 
with the infantry, the batteries were required to position themselves 
well ahead of the assault forces, or as a minimum, parallel to them on 
the flanks. This positioning was the result of direct fire techniques 
which demanded that the artillery crews observe the target for correc-
tion of fire and final target effectivenesi;;. 20 In addition to these 
requirements, the artillery by the nature of its support mission was 
required not only to apply its own particular conclusions from the 
German success, but also it had to apply them in light of infantry 
and cavalry techniques adopted. 
All these and many, many more examples were absorbed from the 
Germans after 1871, and later the Russians after 1877, and upon their 
adoption, these tactical lessons became integral parts of training in 
the British Army. On the training fields practical application of 
19Lord Kitchener of Khartoum gained his prestigious reputation 
during the Sudan Campaigns against the Dervishers. The campaign is 
further distinctive, since the last full scale cavalry charge in 
modern warfare was conducted by the 21st Lancers at the Battle of 
Omdurman on September 12, 1898. 
20The Times (September 4, 1899), p. 8; Edwards. May, Field 
Artillery with.()ther Arms (London: Sampson, Law, Marston ari.d Company, 
1898), p. 37. Indirect fire techniques, or fires which are not ob-
served by the gun crew, but rather by a separate observer were known. 
However, the technique was not fully perfected or widely used. Direct 
fire as observed by the gun crews within full view of the target is not 
unlike sighting a rifle. Furthermore, the dependency on shrapnel shells 
with a time fuse to achieve an air burst, limited ranges in the British 
12-pounder and 15-pounder guns to under 4,000 yards. Beyond that range 
shrapnel bullets had reduced velocity and limited effect. Major May 
advocated locations as near as 1,500 yards as giving the best results 
from fire. 
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theories, combined with discipline, teamwork and well-coordinated 
action became the ultimate ideals to achieve. But the British training 
suffered from an acute limitation in training facilities. 
The home islands were dotted by numerous military posts, but only 
a few such as Aldershot and Okehampton quartered more than a battalion 
at the very most. Adjacent training areas were equally small, since 
most posts consisted of little more than .barracks and a parade ground. 
A combination of branches of the army .stationed at these smaller posts 
was also a rarity. They were either cavalry or infantry stations, 
while the artillery remained at Okehampton, Aldershot and Woolwich, 
where larger ranges existed for their practice. It was truly a garri-
son army with garrison duties, and training on a regular basis was 
limited to drills and formations. With posts scattered all over the 
islands, training took on a decentralized countenance, with local 
commanders determining the needs of their particular units.. Direction 
and guidance from the General Staff consisted of drill regulations, 
and standards of discipline. This created an environment of formal-
ized training where spit and polish and elaborate drills became the es-
sence of training and discipline. Although this outward appearance of 
excellence was marvelled at by the civilians, and gloated over by 
21 
commanders, it did very little to prepare the army for coml;rat. 
Fortunately, there were instances of training in depth being 
carried out, but these were not widespread. In the colonies, especially 
in India, training was on a large scale and very systematically con-
ducted. At larger stations in England, voluntary societies such as the 
21 John K. Dunlop, The Development of the British Army, 1899-1914 
(London:, Methutfo, 1938), pp. 23-24. 
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Royal United Services Institution and the Royal Artillery Institution 
existed. There, conscientious officers could hear lectures and publish 
their own theories. However, these societies did not receive govern-
mental subsidy; rather, they existed on private funds and membership 
dues. Fortunately, their existence did provide out lets for the more 
inquiring officers, and served to reduce the intrenching natµre of 
. . 22 garrison tra1n1ns. 
The need for a more centrally supervised and realistic training 
program was apparent to some in the Army. By the mid-1890's efforts 
were being made to conduct training operations, on a broader scope. 
But it was not until 1898, that the Army held any large scale combined 
maneuvers. These maneuvers were indeed unique, since the last large 
scale training operation occurred in 1875. The results of the extended 
absence of combined maneuvers was readily apparent at the end of the 
operation. It was obvious from the results of the training, that 
staff and commanders were on unfamiliar ground when handling large 
numbers of troops, and cooperation between branches was utterly 
1 k . 23 ac 1ng. As a result, in August of the following year, 1899, another 
large scale combined training maneuver in Ireland and a large artillery 
training operation at Salisbury Plain were held. Additionally, in 
September another smaller comb:i,ned exercise at Al<Jershot was carried 
out. 
The Irish maneuvers began on August 5, and ended on August 15. 
They pitted two forces against each other :i,n a stylized war. On one 
22 Malcolm, p. 395. 
23Ibid., PP• 396-397. 
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side 3,800 men and sixteen guns participated, while on the opposing 
side 5,200 men with sixteen guns were employed. For eleven days the 
mock war roared in Queens County, Ireland, and by the end of the 
24 training much had been gained but even more had been revealed. The 
director of the maneuvers, Lord Roberts, left no one unscathed in his 
critique. He noted that when on the offensive, "care was invariably 
taken to provide superior numbers at the decisive point," but he ex-
plained further, "secondary attacks or feints were insufficiently 
used." Moreover, he pointed out that "the artillery did not always 
cooperate with the infantry, and the infantry often neglected its 
flanks." In addition, one of the most glaring shortcomings resulting 
from the maneuvers, aside from the lack of cooperation, was the inade-
quacies in reconnaissance among all elements. Lord Roberts emphasized 
that poor forward reconnaissance limited decision making on the part 
of corrnnanders, and for the artillery caused delays in occupation of 
. . 25 
new positions. 
At the same time the Irish ,maneuvers were being conducted, six 
brigade-divisions of artillery were training on the Salisbury Plain. 
Beginning on August 4, and ending on August 12, the emphasis of the 
exercise was to gain cooperation of the artillery with other arms, but 
more importantly for the artillery, the exercise was conducted to prac-
tice cooperation of the artillery units within the batteries and the 
b . d d" . . h 1 26 riga e- ivisions t emse ves. The theory of massing guns was 
24A. M. Murray, "The Irish Manoeuvers, 1899," Proceedings of the 
Royal Artillery Institution, XXVI (1899), pp. 461-467. 
25The Times (August 31, 1899), p. 6. 
26 Ibid., (August 15, 1899), P• 5. 
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practiced over and over during the eight days of training. Observers 
were impressed by the size of the force, since eleven six-gun batteries 
and six four-gun batteries, a total of ninety guns, participated in the 
exercise. The results of the training were inconclusive, however, 
because the six brigade-divisions were mythical, three battery organiza-
tions that were disbanded upon completion of the training. It was un-
likely that the batteries which participated would ever train or be 
assigned together again. 
Later, at Aldershot, in September, 1899, General Redevers Buller, 
the director of the maneuvers there, echoed the criticism voiced 
earlier by Lord Roberts. Reconnaissance was badly lacking and coopera-
tion between elements was alarmingly poor. General Buller noted that 
attacks were 11half-hearted and insufficiently supported, 11 and he ad-
monished all commanders for failing to communicate with each other. 
He urged subordinates, particularly artillery commanders, to "obtain 
sufficient information from the supreme commander as to his inten-
27 
tions •" Obviously, if this was accomplished, cooperation between 
elements would be enhanced. 
These maneuvers clearly pointed to the importance of intense 
training in reconnaissance and coordinated efforts among the infantry, 
cavalry and artillery. At the same time it indicated the failings of 
the formalized training, and its inability to cope with modern wlrfare 
and the ever improving weapons that were being developed. 
Weaponry along with other important aspects of warfare such as 
probable enemies, terrain and past experience lends impetus to tactical 
27 rbid., (September 12, 1899), P• 8. 
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thought and training. Historically, one of the most important, if not 
the dominant, factors in creating changes in tactical employment and 
equally affecting training, was the development and improvement of 
armaments. Signposts along the historical path of tactical changes 
in warfare are marked by the advent of the longbow, the development 
of blackpowder which sired rifles and cannons, and the creation of 
ironclad ships with steam power which overcame sailing vessels, to 
name but a few. 
The nineteenth century produced signposts of change in tactics and 
training with some startling developments in weaponry. In the first 
decade, Napoleon indelibly etched into the minds of military men the 
importance of artillery. The American Civil War had given rise to 
cavalry forces armed with breech loading rifles instead of sabres and 
lances, and they became known as mounted infantry. Further, the Civil 
War vividly demonstrated the futility of the cavalry charge against 
a well-armed opposition. By the 1890 1 s magazine-fed, bolt-action 
rifles, such as the Lee-Metford and Mauser, in the hands of practiced 
marksmen increased firepower and extended the boundaries of the battle-
field. Breech loading, rifled cannons increased the volume of fire and 
the range of supporting artillery. The advent of Maxim and Gatling 
machine-guns created a hail of bullets never before conceived as 
possible. With such firepower, fewer men were required to hold a por-
tion of the terrain, thereby releasing more men for maneuver elements. 
Smokeless powder, first adapted to rifles and later to artillery, al-
lowed the benefits of invisibility on the battlefield to be employed. 
Massed guns had proven devastating, and by the early 1890 1 s "quick-
firing" equipment on naval and coastal artillery pieces increased their 
24 
rates of fire. It was evident that the quick-firing principle was soon 
to be applied to field pieces. The nation to achieve it first would 
undoubtedly enjoy a decided advantage over any potential enemy, since 
its impact on tactics had not been fully investigated. Beginning in 
1890, the goal of every gun-maker in Europe and in the United States 
was to design a system to control weapon recoil, the root cause of 
delays in firing and fatiguing labor. The last half of the final 
decade of the nineteenth century was a period of frenzied artillery 
rearmament activity as nations throughout the world adopted intermediate 
28 
systems in search of the true "quick-firing" artill~ry. 
The first attempts by the British to alleviate the recoil problem 
were the attachment of spades to the gun trail which, providing the 
soil was soft enough, buried themselves in the ground when the first 
round was fired. If the surface was hard or rocky, the fatiguing run-
up and relaying process between each round had to be followed. If the 
spade was buried, another problem was created in that no traversing of 
the piece could occur unless the weapon had a traversing gear on the 
weapon carriage. However, the spade did increase the volume of fire 
to a noticeable degree, and it was a step toward "quick-firing" 
28A. S. Buckle, "The Advantages and Disadvantages of Q. F. Guns," 
Proceedings ofthe Royal Artillery Institution, XXV (1898), pp. 357-
358. "A Q. F. gun may be defined as one which is so constructed and 
mounted that it may be loaded, layed, and fired quickly; that is 
quickly as compared with an ordinary B. L. [breechloader J gun. For use 
on board ship or in a fort, where there is no objection to extra 
weight or complication, it is now easy to produce Q. F. guns that can 
be fired 1 from the shoulder,' as it were like a rifle: and the opera-
tion of loading can be simplified by the use of fixed ammunition without 
disadvantage." Fixed ammunition consists of a projectile and powder 
increments in a fixed cartridge, similar to rifle ammunition. 
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· 11 29 art1 ery. 
Even though the British made some tests on a few new weapon de-
signs, they seemed satisfied with the breech loading weapons with the 
attached spade, and made little effort to adopt the quick-firing 
principle further. In 1898, that was not the case with other European 
nations, however. By the end of that year, Germany rearmed its artil-
lery with what it termed Q. F. guns, but upon investigation by the 
British, it was found that the guns were simply outfitted with trail 
d d h 1 b k b . h . 1 30 spa es an wee ra es too v1ate t e reco1 • It was France that 
really created a stir with the adoption of its Q. F. guns in 1898 and 
1899. The weapon was kept as a top secret item for a number of years 
after its development, but rumors of its stability and rapid fire 
capabilities were widespread. Major General Henry Brackenbury, the 
new Director General of Ordnance, hinted at its uniqueness in May, 
1899, at a meeting of the Royal United Service Institution. He told 
the gathering, "you will shortly learn that the French have got a real 
quick-firing field-gun •••• [they] think that this will require changes 
in tactics." The French reinforced their claim and faith in the new 
weapon by reducing the number of guns in a battery from six to four. 31 
In 1894, Austria began experiments with quick-firing guns, and 
29 May, pp. 292-295; C. A. 
ment of Artillery (Woolwich: 
pp. 74- 7 5. 
L. Graham, The Story of the Royal Regi-
The Royal Artillery Institution, 1944), 
301. R. Kenyon, 11Q. F. Field Equipments on the Continent, 11 Proceed-
ings of the Royal Artillery Institution, XXVI (1899), pp. 139-145. 
31 James, p. 282; Charles Callwell and John M. G. Headlam, The 
History of the Royal Artillery from the Indian Mutiny to the Great War 
(2 vols. Woolwich: The Royal Artillery Institution, 1937), Vol. 2, p. 
13. The French weapon was the well-known and widely used French 11 7 511 
of World War I fame. 
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in 1896, Spain began testing Krupp, Maxim-Nordenfelt and Saint Charmond 
32 
weapon~.~ In addition to these countries, Belgium, Switzerland, Rus-
sia and Italy all began testing weapon designs after 1895. By 1899, 
Turkey had ordered 1,000 German Q. F. guns, and Russia, Austria and 
Italy had adopted intermediate systems to increase rates of fire. They 
along with Belgium and Switzerland were continuing to test new weapon 
design~. 33 
i 
The continental situation as well as the growing tensions in 
South Africa, where the Boers had begun outfitting their Staats Artil-
lery with Q. F. guns as early as 1896, made it incumbent on the 
British to begin testing quick-firing guns. Serious and wide-spread 
study regarding the quick-firing principle occurred in England between 
1897 and 1899, and numerous articles began appearing in professional 
· 1 · . 1 f h · d 34 mi itary Journa s o t e per10 • In Parliament in February, 1899, 
questions were being asked of the War Office concerning the adoption 
of Q. F. guns. On February 13, George Wydham, Under Secretary of State 
for War advised Parliament that conversion of Horse and Field Artillery 
batteries to quick-firing guns would begin in March, and proceed with 
the least possible delay. 35 Four days later, however, he advised that 
h h 1 d ld . . 36 t e c ange-over was as ow process an wou require t+me. 
32 Kenyon, pp. 147-151. 
33Ibid., pp. 155-156. 
34Ibid., p. 158£. .Kenyon points out that the Boers ordered Q. F. 
guns from the Schneider manufacturers in 1896. 
35Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of 
Commons), 4th Ser., Vol. LXVI (7 Feb.-20 Feb., 1899), P• 666. 
36 Ibid., p. 1282. 
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The weapon selected for adoption by the British artillery was a 
Vickers manufactured 3-inch, 12~-pounder, and its adoption was indeed 
slow. The report of the Times in January, 1899, seemed to set the 
tone of British rearmamentg "unless the unforeseen precipitates mat-
ters, it may be some time before a general rearmament of the Horse and 
37 Field Artillery takes place." As late as September~ 1899, the only 
evidence of steps to increase the rates of fire of the Royal Regiment vs 
weapons was additional modification to thirty-six existing 12~pounder 
and 15-pounder, breech loaders, by adding a spade suspended from the 
38 
axles. As for the Vickers weapon, it appeared in the inventory later, 
and only after many additional tests were made on the system. 
As of September, 1899, the Royal Regiment was armed with 3-inch, 
15 pounder, breech loader pieces for the Field Artillery, and a lighter 
weight, 3-inch, 12-pounder, breech loader pieces for the Horse Artil-
lery. Both weapons were designed and adopted in 1884, and modified in 
1895, to accept smokeless cordite powder. Each weapon had a maximum 
shrapnel range of 3,650 yards. Furthermore, these weapons fired 
shrapnel shell exclusively, and carried no other shell type in their 
limber. The Field Artillery had additional heavy howitzer batteries 
equipped with 5-inch howitzers. Since this weapon had a higher tra-
jectory than the field gun and a maximum range of 4,900 yards, the 
3711vickers Quick-Firing Field Equipment,_" Journal of the Military 
Services Institution of the United States, xxiv (1899), pp. 145-148; 
The Times (January 16-,-1899), p. 4~ W~apon dtsignations within the 
Britishl\rmy varied between shell weight and ~uzzle size or caliber. 
Generally speaking, within the scope of this ~tudy, weapons under 
three inches in caliber are designated by shell weight. Those weapons 
larger than three inches are designated by caliber. 
38 Callwell and Headlam, p. 14-15. 
5-inch howitzer was employed to search enemy lines with its explosive 
lyddite shells or if need be, its shrapnel projectiles. 39 Garrison 
28 
Artillery, as the name implies, was not a mobile force. Quite the con-
trary, it manned the coastal artillery fortifications at home and in 
the colonies with its huge stationary mounted 6-inch naval guns and 
4.7-inch quick-firing artillery piece~. 40 
In addition to weapons and beyond leadership, which c_an only be 
adequately tested in battle, the final element of an efficient military 
establishment is its organization. The mythical brigade-division has 
already been touched upon, and it was not the only illusionary organi-
zation in the British Army. The two army corps prepared for deployment 
to a foreign theater and the two reinforced corps for the home defense 
, 
were in existence only on paper. There were no corps or division 
commanders or staff. When mobilization occurred, units were picked 
from throughout the Empire to come together as a division or corps 
under a commander and staff who had not trained them nor administered 
39u. s., War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, Second 
(Military Information) Division, Selected Translations Pertaining to 
the Boer War (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), p. 2~ 
The shrapnel shell is analogous to buckshot in a shotgun shell, except 
the shrapnel shell was used with a time fuse to achieve an air burst. 
The burst of the shell opened the casing and the velocity of the shell 
propelled the shrapnel pellets. As range increased, velocity decreased, 
and the shrapnel effect was correspondingly diminished. Therefore, the 
maximum range for best effect in the 12 and 15-pounders was 3,650 yardso 
Beyond that range, even though longer. ranges could be achieved, the 
velocity diminished to a point where the pellets simply fell uselessly 
to the ground. Shrapnel shell, however, was very effective and 
efficient against unprotected troops within its range limitations. 
Lyddite shells were purely explosive. Initially developed for the 
navy, they were ignited with a point detonating fuse. The lyddite shell 
depended upon its explosive shock wave to inflict damage, since it had 
very little fragmentation effect. 
40Ibid., p. 240 
them. The units which made up the divisions and corps may have come 
from a proud regiment, but upon mobilization the regiment had no 
guarantee it would fight as a unit. 41 
The Royal Regiment of Artillery was no different from any other 
branch in the Army, but to add to the organization confusion further, 
on January 28, 1899, a Royal Warrant was issued that reorganized the 
Regiment. The warrant stated: 
The mounted .and dismounted branches of the Royal Regiment 
of Artillery shall be separated into two corps under the 
general title of Royal Regiment of Artillery to be named 
respectively (a) the Royal Horse and Field Artillery; 
(b) the Royal Garrison Artillery.42 
ALthough exchanges of personnel between branches of the Regiment were 
authorized, they were limited to transfers between the Royal Horse 
and the Royal Field Artilleries. The Mountain Artillery found itself 
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designated as Garrison Artillery; and since most of its personnel were 
either Horse or Field artillerymen considerable grumbling in the Gar-
rison ranks could be heard. It was decided that Garrison artillerymen 
could transfer to the Royal Horse or Royal Field Artillery when open-
43 · ings presented themselves. Otherwise there was no movement by per-
sonnel between branches. As one observer put it, "a stroke· of a pen 
has deprived our mobile Army of an artillery force of over 15,000 men 
44 
and 800 officers trained to the working and moving of heavy guns." 
This connnent emphastzed the fact that these men were absolutely con-
41The Times (October 9, 1899), p. 8. 
42 rbid., (June 3, 1~99), P• 9. 
43 Callwell and Headlam, PP• 2-4. 
44The Times (November 13, 1899), p. 16. 
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fined to the Garrison Artillery ranks, with little or no hope of using 
them in the other branches should the need arise. 
Thus, the British Army stood on the eve of war in 1899. After 
months of diplomatic meandering between the British Government and 
Transvaal tensions boiled over, and on October 11, 1899, the Boer Army 
crossed the Vaal River into ~atal and the Cape Colony, to test the 
mettle of the British Army. Few thought it would last for long, and 
most were of the same opinion as a German officer who opted that the 
Boers were about to face 11 the best equipped and most experienced regu-
lar artillery supported by picked Cavalry regiments, recognized in 
Europe as the finest in the world.11 45 
There was little doubt in most Englishmenvs minds that was a true 
evaluation of the British Army, but there was unfortunately, an under-
current of intrenchment in past glories and inflexibility toward change 
in the British military. Planning, tactical thought and training were 
all based on one man's decision made in the midst of the realities of 
1888, not 1899. Organization was purely a paper drill that yielded 
an absent chain of command and lack of unity. The glories of the past 
were epitomized in the sabre-bearing cavalry which, ignoring the les-
sons of the American Civil War, allowed their carbines to rest in their 
saddles. The artillery, heralded as one of the best in the world, was 
equipped with fifteen year old weapons that were no match for the 
newest guns being manufactured in Europe. Training, the key to disci-
pline and knowledge, was so decentralized that it had become unimagi-
native and lacked realism. When large scale training was accomplished 
45rbid., (October 11, 1899), p. 10. 
only two months before the war, reconnaissance, the key to decision 
making and target acquisition, was acutely lacking, and cooperation 
between elements was poor as well. The British Army had identified 
these shortcomings, but time was needed to improve the deficiencies. 
Time, however, was passing them by. War was in the offing, and the 
army was going to see the weaknesses reoccur ~gain and again with 
disastrous results before they were corrected. 
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CHAPTER III 
FROM TALANA HILL TO BLACK WEEK 
When the Dutch republics received the British rejection of their 
ultimatum on October 11, 1899, columns in the Drakensburg Mountains, 
bordering the strategic wedge formed by Natal began crossing in mass. 
In the west, similar elements closed on Kimberley and Mafeking. By 
October 16, 1899, both towns were under siege and the British Natal 
forces were being pressed toward Ladysmith. On November 2, only two 
days after the arrival of Gener~l Buller in Cape Town, Lucas Meyer, 
commander of Boer forces in Natal, occupied the town of Colenso, thir-
teen kilometers south of Ladysmith and 10,000 British troops were en-
circled. Upon the completion of investment of British Natal forces, 
the Boers refrained from making further marked advances into Natal and 
the Cape Colony. This hesitancy allowed General Buller time to build 
up his forces and prepare for his own offensive. 
Buller 1 s original plan called for an offensive thrust along the 
DeAar-Mafeking Railroad in the west to the capital of Transvaal, 
Pretoria. The plan assumed General George White's forces in Natal would 
remain active until the offensive began. Once on the move, the Boers 
in Natal would be compelled to withdraw to protect their capital, and 
thereby relieve the pressures on General White so he could assume an 
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offensive posture as well. 1 Ladysmith' s investment scuttled the plan, 
and Buller decided to redistribute his forces to relieve the invested 
towns in both theaters, as well as reinforce and stabilize the situation 
in northern Cape Colony. 
Ge:p.eral Paul Methuen was given command of the First Division and 
assigned the mission to relieve Kimberley and Mafeking. General William 
Gatacre was given a composite detachment and assigned the northern Cape 
Colony. In Natal, General Francis Clery was given a division, and Bul-
ler himself assumed command of that theater to relieve Ladysmith. 
When all forces were collected and prepared for the offensive, 
Methuen in the west moved first. His advance began well enough, with 
victories at Belmont on November 23, Graspan on November 25, and at the 
Modder River three days later on November 28. After the Modder River 
engagement, the British paused to regroup and reinforce. The flush of 
victory was growing, but shortly disaster struck. At Stormberg Junc-
tion on December 10, General Gatacre's forces suffered a crushing de-
feat, followed the next day by yet another defeat at Magersfontein, 
where Methuen's division suffered severe casualties. These two defeats 
were shattering, but on December 15, General Buller 1 s attack on Colenso 
was repulsed. In a matter of six days the British Army had suffered 
smashing reversals in all theaters of the war zone, losing 2,796 
1Great Br:i,tain, Report of. His Maj esty 1 s Commissioners, pp. 271-
272. 
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soldiers, killed, wounded and captured. 
After these defeats, the inadequacies that had been identified 
in training in August and September, along with some new revelations 
of warfare were clearly in the open. Criticism ran rampant in the 
wake of the reversals, and among the most prevalent accusations were 
those directed at the Royal Regiment of Artillery. A great hue and 
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cry arose over the apparent success of long range artillery over mobile 
field guns, and moreover, Boer field pieces had exceeded the range of 
the British 12-pounder and 15-pounder. The criticism became a paren-
thetical accusation that the Royal Regiment had provided inadequate 
support of maneuver forces. 
However, examination of specific engagements, both victories 
and defeats, illustrates that the defeats were not totally the result 
of inadequate artillery. On the contrary, the Royal Regiment performed 
exceptionally in all engagements. Range limitations of Ho.rse and Field 
Artillery batteries were a notable deficiency resulting from the initial 
engagements of the Boer War, but this deficiency was not the overriding 
cause of ineffective artillery .support. It was obvious that the nature 
of the terrain and climate in South Africa caused the long range artil-
lery guns to carve an impressive niche for themselves on the mobile 
battlefield, but speed and mobility remained a dominant feature of 
2 L. S. Amery, ed._, The TimesHistory of_the_War in South Africa 
(7 vols. London: Sampson, Law~ Marston an4 Company, Limited, 1900-
1909), Vol. VII, App. III, p. 24, At Stor~berg Junction, British losses 
were twenty-nine killed, fifty-seven wound,d, and 633 captured or miss-
ing. At Magersfontein they am6uhted to 24tt killed, 651 wounded and 
seventy~six captured or missing. At Colen~o 171 were killed, 738 
wounded and 197 captured or mi~sing. 
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warfare. 
The difficulties in artillery support ran deeper than simply 
range limitations. Most of the British difficulties were complicated 
by an initial unappreciative view of the importance that cover, camou-
flage and smokeless powder was able to assume in warfare. The Boer 
employment of these old and new facets of warfare exposed the British 
inadequacies. The immediate result of them was found in insufficient 
reconnaissance and poor coordination between maneuver elements and 
artillery. Poor reconnaissance yielded equally poor decisions on the 
part of the cormnanders, and of particular importance to the artillery, 
inadequate reconnaissance reduced target acquisition. The artillery 
engaged phantom _targets, and ended in being called ineffective. Ad-
ditionally, shrapnel shell and lyddite were proved adequate, but 
certainly not as destructive as had been anticipated. Cqnfused and 
demoralized by the Boers' masterful use of camouflage and cover, 
coordination between elements, already identified as a weakness, fell 
into absolute disorder, and disaster struck. 
The beginnings of British difficulties were identifiable in the 
early days of the war. In Natal, north of Ladysmith near the rail 
junction at Glenco and the coal mines of Dundee, two short but import-
ant battles were fought which illustrated possible future difficulties. 
On October 19, a brief but bloody battle was fought between the Boer 
advance elements and a British column under the cormnand of General 
William Symons. 
The Boers had hastily entrenched themselves along the crest of 
Talana Hill overlooking the small coal mining town of Dundee. Symons 
decided to attack the position, but the tenacious Boers were unwilling 
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to surrender the position quickly. Beginning early in the morning, 
the British assaulted the hill three successive times before the Boers 
decided to retire from the area leaving three of their six artillery 
3 pieces and losing 300 to 500 m~n. 
The British paid a heavy price for the victory, however. Count-
ing General Symons, who was fatally wounded early in the action, fifty-
seven were killed and ninety-two were wounded in the skirmish. Judging 
from the casualty figures, this battle was a fierce engagefflent. 4 From 
an artillery point of view, difficulties were already present. Three 
batteries of artillery were employed within 1, 400 yards of the hill, 
and they fired almost continuously for three hours from that position 
before the Boers evacuated the hill. Ominously, the captured Boer 
guns were found intact, and moreover, the shrapnel shell employed by 
the British had failed to totally silence hostile small arms fire. 
The Boers, in covered trenches, although not elaborate, were provided 
with sufficient protection to allow them to engage the British infantry 
5 
without fear of injury from artillery shrapn~l. 
The second engagement to be considered was fought at Elandslaagte 
on October 22, and it produced similar results. Again the British 
artillery was brought close to the objective, within 1,800 yards. 
There at almost point blank range, the three British batteries poured 
3The Times (January 2, 1900), p. 12; J.P. Wisser, "The Second 
Boer War, 11 Journal of the United States Artillery, XIII (1900), p. 258. 
4 Amery, Vol. VII, App. III, P• 24. 
5The Times (January 2, 1900), p. 12. 
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shrapnel shell after shrapnel shell at the Boer position. The Boers 
again, taking advantage of the cover available, were able to keep up a 
murderous small arms fire. At one point in the battle, the British 
infantry advance stalled momentarily only 100 yards from the Boer en-
trenchments, as the Boers increased the volume of small arms fire. 
Overwhelmed for a moment the infantry waited for the hostile fire to 
reduce before they rose and overwhelmed the positipn.Q 
Clearly, the actions at Talana Hill and Elandslaagte were victor-
ies for the British, and much of the credit was attributed to the Royal 
Artillery. However, the Boer trenches had not been effectively pene-
trated, and subsequently, the artillery had not successfully silenced 
the Boer rifle fire. Furthermor~ the artillery had hot eliminated the 
Boer artillery, and repeatedly the Boers managed to reposition some of 
their guns in covered and protected sites. The Boer guns were assumed 
to be silenced and destroyed, but they frequently reappeared to engage 
the infantry. The British guns engaged the new Boer artillery position 
and silenced the weapon, only to have it reappear at a new location. 
Fortunately for the British, the Boer shrapnel shell was not function-
ing properly, or more casualties would have been suffered. The 
apparent ineffectiveness of the British shrapnel shell against the 
entrenched Boers was not appreciated, however, and the Times declared 
British superiority in artillery a "foregone conclusion." All that 
h . 7 was seen waste v~ctory. 
6rbid.; Wisser, p. 261. The account in the Times and that rendered 
by Captain Wisser note that the British rose to the charge in charac-
teristic British tradition, with trumpet sounding and the piper playing 
a national air on the bagpipes. 
7The Times (October 23, 1899), p. 8. 
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The cheers were soon silenced by the roar of a large caliber, 
long range gun hurling its ninety pountl shells, first on the British 
camp at Dundee on October 21, and reappearing later as the skirmish 
near Reitfontein on October 24. The gun, nicknamed "Lqng Tom, 11 was one 
of several Creusot, 6-inch garrison guns that the Boers had made mobile 
to employ as a field gun. The big gun far out-ranged the British field 
pieces. Additionally, there were four 12-centimeter Krupp mobile siege 
guns in the area around Ladys~ith.8 General White had already received 
intelligence information indicating that the Boers were in possession 
of heavy mobile guns, and in response to this information, and before 
their use at Dundee, he telegraphed Durban urgently requesting large 
caliber guns to offset the expected disadvanta~e. 9 
At Durban, White's request was greeted with some confusion, since 
no guns of large caliber were in a mobile configuration. However, at 
anchor in the harbor rested the H. M. s. Terrible, and the ship's 
captain, Percy Scott suggested that he and his men could build a car-
riage and limber to move the ship I s 12-pounder and 4-. 7-inch quick-
firing naval guns. Although scoffed at by some, Captain Scott, using 
wagon wheels and long wooden timbers for gun trails, succeeded in 
mounting one 12-pounder. A single 4.7-inch gun was taken from the 
ship, mounting and all, and bolted to four wooden beams. Then the 
8u. s. War Department, Adjutant General's Office, "Extracts from 
the Report of Captain Carl Reichmann, Seventeenth Infantry, on the 
Operations of the Boer Army, 11 Reports~- Military _Operations_ in South 
Africa and China, 1901' (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), 
---· ·- . P• 131. 
9 J. A. Coxhead, "The Second Brigade Di vision, Royal Field 
Artillery, in the Natal Campaign, 1899-1900: Up to the Relief of Lady-
smith," Proceedings of the Royal Artillery_ Institution, XXVII ( 1901), 
p. 440. 
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t t . tt h d t h 1 d 1 · b · 1 lO con rap ion was a ace o wagon wees an ong timer tra1, ~· 
Once mounted it was necessary to determine if the new carriages 
could withstand firing without collapsing or turning over. Scott's 
design proved more than adequate, and the 12-pounder fired to a range 
of 9,000· yards without ill effect to the carriage. The larger, 4.7-inch 
gun threw its lyddite shell an amazing 12,000 yards, and no known artil-
lery piece could match that. After the successful tests, Scott had 
f 12 d d 4 7 . h . . 1 1 d 1l our -poun ers an two • -iric guns s1.m1. ar y mounte • 
The problem facing the ingenious Scott at this point was determin-
ing how to move these monstrosities. The trip to Ladysmith was to be 
by rail, but once there, the guns were too heavy to be manhandled. 
Apparently he chose three double teams of horses, four abreast 
... 11 12 1. nit 1, a y. Later the horses were replaced by large teams of oxen. 
Unfortunately, there was no time to make the huge guns more mobile or 
pleasing to the eye, and satisfied with horse drawn weapons for the 
moment, three of the 12-pounders and two 4.7-inch guns were dispatched 
to Ladysmith. They arrived at General White's headquarters on October 
30, just in time to participate in the withdrawal of two British 
columns which had attempted to take a "Long Tom" position at Lombard 1 s 
Kop, four miles northeast of the city. 13 
During the night of October 29 and the morning of October 30, two 
lOThe Times (November 21, 1899), P• 7. 
11Ibid •. 
12 John McCrea, "Artillery: Its Employment in the South African 
War, 11 Selec.ted Papers from the Transactions_.Qi_ the Canadian Military 
Institute, 1902, XII (1903), P• 21. 
13 Coxhead, p. 440. 
columns from Ladysmith had been sent to silence the big gun, In the 
process of the night movement toward Lombard's Kop, a flank security 
element composed of the First Gloucesters along with elements of the 
10th Mountain Battery were separated from the main body and the Boers 
forced them to surrender at a position known as Nicholson's Nek. At 
that action alone 850 British soldiers were captured, and the British 
14 Natal force suffered a severe bloy, 
The other forces, however, continued to advance toward Lombard's 
40 
Kop only to find the position vacated. The adjacent ridges, however, 
were not empty, and the columns were engaged by small arms and artil-
lery from concealed positions. The First and Second Brigade Divisions, 
six batteries in all, were moved up to support the elements in contact. 
They succeeded in suppressing the Boer fire sufficiently and the 
infantry and cavalry elements withdrew. In this instance, the British 
artillery had to run a gauntlet of small arms and shrapnel fire to get 
in position to support, but did so with minimal loss. It was evident 
that Boer shrapnel was poor in quality, and the fuse failed to detonate 
the projectile consistently. Even though the Boer guns ranged the 
British artillery, the results were less than satisfactorz, 15 
Still the harrassing fires from the Boer artillery and small arms 
demanded withdrawal to Ladysmith, and when it began, the British gun-
ners covered the retirement in a leap-frog fashion. At least one 
battery was left in firing position until the other forces were 
approaching its maximum range. At that point another battery would 
14Ibid., p. 473; Amery, Vol. VII, App. I, P• 1. 
15 Coxhead, p. 473. 
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go into position and the former limbered up and retired to the with-
drawing column. To add to an already complicated maneuver, the British 
column was harrassed by the Long Toms throughout the movement. The 
newly arrived naval guns at Ladysmith were ordered into action to sup-
port the British withdrawal, by engaging the Long Toms at Pepworth 
16 Hi,11, two miles north of the city. 
The Times _credited the naval guns with saving the day at Ladysmith, 
but not to be outdone, an artilleryman present in the action called the 
report "absurd." He elaborated by saying that the 11 200 jolly sailors 
were as gallant a body as any other 200 in the garrison but it took 
more than 200 to save Ladysmith." 17 
The Times was apparently convinced of the importance of the long 
range guns, but the growing severity of the situation at Ladysmith 
quickly clouded the issue. On November 2, reports from Durban and Cape 
Town indicated that Orange State Boers, commanded by General Lucas 
Meyer were in Colenso, south of Ladysmith. Ladysmith was inve-&ted. 18 
So began an investment that lasted until February 26, 1900, during 
which time, the Boers took special delight in bombarding the town with 
heavy guns. Soon, however, they proved ineffective on the whole, and 
the British troops in Caesar's Camp at Ladysmith, for example, began 
playing a cat and mouse game with the Long Tom at Bulwana Hill. After 
timing the flight of the Long Tom1 s shell, it was determined that thirty 
seconds was required for the round to fall at Caesar's Camp. An obser-
16Ibid., pp. 473-475. 
17The Times (November 3, 1899), p. 5; Coxhead, P• 479. 
-----
18The Times (November 3, 1899), p. 5. 
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vation tower was built, and when the Long Tom was moved into firing 
position, a bell was sounded, signalling the garrison to take covero 
Later in the siege, the bombardment became routine and predictable. 
The Boers refused to fire on the Sabbath, and on weekdays they contented 
themselves by firing for a brief period each morning, noon and evening. 
As the siege progressed, the concern grew more for food and health than 
f . . b B · 11 . 19 or inJury y oer arti ipry. 
Meanwhile, in Cape Town, General Buller had arrived and began his 
troop redistribution to effect the relief of the three invested garri-
sons. To provide for the relief of Kimberley and Mafeking, Buller 
allocated three brigades of infantry and a brigade-division of field 
artillery consisting of the three 15-pounder field batteries to form 
the First Division under Lord Methuen. A similarly configured division 
was plac.ed under the command of General Clery and dispatched to Durban. 
A.mixed detachment of three and one half infantry battalions and three 
field artillery batteries was given to General Gatacre. His division 
was placed at Queenstown, Cape Colony, to prepare for operations in 
northern sections of the Cape where Boers had control of Stormberg 
20 Junction and Naauwpoort. 
On November 19, 1899, Lord Methuen and his First Division was 
concentrated at the Orange River north of DeAar, and prepared to 
proceed with the planned offensive. Crossing the Orange River, 
Methuen's division transport train approached the outskirts of the city 
19 Coxhead, pp. 476-478. 
20 
w. H. H. Waters, tran~., The War in South Africa_~ Prepared in 
the Historical Section of the Great General Staff, Berlin (Lonqon~ 
John Murray, 1904), pp ~45~33-235; The Times (January 2, 1900), p. 8. 
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of Belmont on November 23. Withdrawing Boers had formed a strong de-
fensive position at Belmont, but failing to employ any of their own 
artillery, they were quickly overrun by the British. However, British 
casualties at Belmont were la'rger than had been expected, and indicated 
that dispersion by infantry elements had not been adopted by British 
21 force~. 
Aftec the Belmont success, Methuen continued to pursue the with-
drawing Bqers, and drove them from defensive positions at Graspan on 
November 25. However, Graspan proved more difficult than Belmont. The 
Boers employed a battery of Krupp field pieces, one isolated Nordenfelt 
field gun and one Maxim machine gun in the action. At Belmont none of 
these auxilia~ies had been used. Employing the 9th Brigade and the 
newly a~tached Naval Brigade, supported by two batteries of artillery, 
22 
Methuen forced the Boers to withdraw after a three hour engagem~nt. 
While Methuen was continuing his advance after the fall of Gras-
pan, the Boers were preparing stifrer resistance. Along the Riet 
River on either side of the railroad bridge at the Madder River 
Station, a large Boer force was preparing entrenched and well-camou-
flaged positions. On the west side of the bridge, Free Staters occu-
pied camouflaged trenches on both banks of the river. Transvaal Boers 
were similarly configured on the east side. Five Krupp 7-pounders, 
21
"The Boer War in South Africa," Journal~ the Military Service 
Institution of the United States, XXVI (1900), pp. 52-53; Amery, Vol. 
VII, App. IiT;° ~24. At. Jelmont, seventy-five British were killed 
and 223 were wounded. · 
2211The Boer War in South Africa,".Journal_2f.the_Military _Services 
Institution of the UnitedStat~s, XXVI (1900), p. 54. Indications that 
officers' uniforms made th~m'. excellent targets arose from the Belmont 
engagement. The Naval Bri&ade suffered heavily in the battle, and the 
Times (November 30, 1899), p4ge 5, reported that 11 the naval detachment 
retained their swords; consedJ.uently they suffered excessive loss •••• 
their total casualties being 100. 11 
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three 37-millimeter "porn-porns" and a Maxim machine gun were positioned 
on the north bank of the river near the railway station buildings. In 
23 
all more than 5,000 men were deployed by the Bo~r~. 
At 0500 hours, November 28, Lord Methuen's scouts reported the 
position was well-camouflaged and strongly entrenched, but they had 
failed to notice all the pos'itions on the near or south bank of the 
river. Reportedly, Methuen was not convinced that the Boer position 
was as strong as described. Furthermore, the river itself was running 
full, and Methuen discounted a flanking movement to gain a fording 
position. In any case, he immediately deployed his Scots Guards only 
minutes after his scouts' report. Supported by a battery of artillery 
the Guards moved along the east side of the railway, advancing toward 
the river. The 9th Brigade supported by another battery of artillery 
advanced along the western axis. The Boer infantry had received 
orders not to engage the British infantry until they were within 100 
24 yards;. 
At 0530 hours, the Boer artillery engaged the British guns, and 
the British batteries quickly returned the volley. Soon, the entire 
25 Boer defensive line opened fire on the British infantry. Methuenvs 
artillery batteries began returning accurate shrapnel fire on the Boer 
trenches and the Guards began advancing again, only to be thrown back 
after suffering severe casualties. Still, the British artillery con-
23charles Parsons, "Narrative of a Boer taken Prisoner at Taungs, 
S. w. Border of Transvaal, During the War in South Africa, 1899-1900," 
Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, XXIX (1903), p. 7. 
24 · The Times (January 16, 1900), p. 6; Parsons, p. 8. 
25Ibid.; The Times (November 30, 1899), p. 5. 
tinued their shooting, even though under a murderous small arms fire. 
The Boer artillery on the north bank was silenced, and by noon the 
Orange State Boers west of the bridge had withdrawn after elements of 
the 9th Brigade had forded the riyer. 26 
Th,e Transvaal Boers were now jeopardized by a possible flanking 
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maneuver. Their commander, General J. F. DeBeer, dispatched messengers 
to the retiring Orange Staters, ordering them to return to their 
positions, but they refused. By nightfall, DeBeer was in an untenable 
position with elements of the British force crossing the river on the 
east as well as the west. At 2000 hours, DeBeer was ordered to retire 
and withdrawing his tired infantry and badly damaged artillery, he 
b d 1 Ma f . 27 egan an or er y retreat to gers ont~in. 
The British had achieved another victory, but again it was an 
expensive one. After counting casualties, the British had twenty-four 
officers and 459 enlisted men dead and wounded. Stili the Boers had 
been beaten at Madder River, and Lord Methuen praised all his men for 
28 
their effort~. 
The advance of Lord Methueri' s division had its successes, but 
inadequacies were rising to the surface. All the engagements had been 
costly in killed and wounded. At Graspan the Naval Brigade's officers 
were almost annihilated. At Madder River, four officers were killed 
and twenty were wounded. It became evi.dent that officers could no 
longer strut around in their distinctive uniforms and flashing sabers. 
26 . Parsons, p. 8; The Times (December 5, 1899), p. 5. 
27 Parson, pp. 8-9. 
28 Amery, Vol. VII, App. III, p. 24; The Times (November 30, 1899), 
p. 5. 
If they did, experience had shown that they could be singled out and 
killed or wounded by Boer sharpshooters. They had to conform in 
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attire to the whole of the forces, or very soon the officer corps would 
be severely depleted. 
The ,inadequate reconnaissance noted at the maneuvers before the 
war was again demonstrated at the Modder River engagement. Although the 
positions across the river were recognized, those on the near bank had 
not been adequately identified. Of course, the Boer camouflage reduced 
their possible discovery. With reconnaissance poor at best, long range 
reconnaissance was virtually absent. This was evident in the fact that 
Methuen was notified of the Modder River positions at 0500 hours that 
morning, and the engagement joined just thirty minutes later. Even 
though the British knew the Modder River Station was defended, the 
strength of the defense was not determined, and they were clearly sur-
prised at Modder River. Methuen could only react to the situation 
rather than plan the action in depth. 
The Royal Regiment performed excellently at Modder River, and 
they were the deciding factor in the engagement. Even though constantly 
within range of Boer small arms and artillery fire, they remained in 
position and continued to shoot. At one position along the front the 
artillery was within 400 yards of the Boer entrenchrnenti;,. 29 This was 
well within the range of the Mauser rifle used by the Boers, and the 
British gu.nners obviously worked under a severe handicap. At times 
during the course of the battle, the British infantry was forced to seek 
cover when the Boer fire grew too intense, and this effectively denuded 
29 Parsons, p. 8. 
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the artillery batteries. Still the gunners managed to keep up a 
continuous and accurate shrapnel fire. Prisoner interviews after the 
engagement remarked at the excellence and courage of the British 
gunners, and Lord Methuen singled out the artillery for particular 
praise. All were in accord with the Times, which voiced the opinion 
that "it was our superior artillery which won the day." Clearly the 
Boers had made a mistake of their own, and allowed the British guns to 
advance too close to their position. The resulting shrapnel fire at 
such a close range was extremely effective. 30 
After the fight at the Modder River, Lord Methuen established a 
temporary camp to await reinforcements. Meanwhile, General Buller in 
Natal continued preparing to make his advance to reli~ve Ladysmith. 
Training and building up his forces, General Buller was about to embark 
on his own offensive. In the center General Gatacre's smaller division 
was training and preparing to begin the offensive as well. The ad-. 
vances of Lord Methuen and the continued preparations of forces in 
other theaters contributed to a feeling of confi,dence, and morale was 
high within the army and at home. However, the confidence and morale 
were about to receive the f;i.rst of three severe blows. 
In the Cape Colony, General Gatacre made the decision to conduct 
a night attack against the Boers who held Stormberg Junction. It was 
a bold dec~sion, because night attacks were historically difficult to 
accomplish and control. However, General Gatacre had spent the month 
I 
of November training his detachment for the planned attack on Storm-
berg. On the night of D~cember 9, employing 2,500 men and twelve 
30Th .T. . e 1.mes 
-- -,-----
(December 6, 1899), p. 5. 
field guns, General Gatacre began his move against an equal force of 
Boers entrenched at Stormberg. Unfortunately, the British force, 
after becoming disoriented during the sixteen hour march, came under 
murderous fire from the Stormberg defenses. At daylight on December 
10, a su~vey of the situation convinced General Gatacre he had to 
withdraw. Employing his artillery to cover the retirement, General 




The artillery was the only bright spot in the entire action, and 
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they were credited with averting disaster by their prompt and accurate 
covering fir_e. However, disaster had not been totally avoided. The 
British lost fifty-seven killed, ninety-two wounded and 633 missing or 
captured at Stormberg. The night attack had been a brilliant idea, 
but its execution was poor. Inadequate reconnaissance and dependency 
upon native guides of questionable loyalty were blamed for the 
32 def ~q;t. 
The loss at Stormberg Junction only signalled the coming of more 
severe failures. During the next six days two more repulses of 
British forces occurred, and so severe were these defeats to the morale 
and confidence of G:i;eat Britain that the press soon named the period 
"Black Week. 11 
The next repulse came close on the heels of Stormberg Junction. 
In the west Lord Methuen's forces had been resting and refitting after 
the fight at the Modder River. The Boers for their part had been pre-
31The Times (December 12, 1899), p. 9. 
--··---i---
32Ibid.; Amery, Vol. VII, App. III, P• 24. 
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paring for the coming fight too. At Belmont and Graspan they had 
occupied the crests of the kopjes, but at their new position near the 
town of Magersfontein, they decided to entrench themselves along the 
bottoms of the ridge line south of the city. Their force amounted to 
7,000 mounted troops and 4,000 infantry with thirteen guns. They occu-
pied the kopj e chain that extended west to the DeAar-Mafeking Railroad 
and east to the Jacobsdal Highway. From that point the Boers extended 
their trenches beyond the hills in a southeasterly direction and 
anchored their left flank on the north bank of the Madder River. The 
trench system was elaborate with overhead cover provided in most cases, 
and as had become their habit, the entire area was extremely well 
33 
camouflaged. 
Methuen's forces had been substantially increased during his 
halt at the Madder River Station. On the eve of the engagement the 
First Division consisted of three brigades of infantry composed of 
thirteen battalions, one cavalry brigade with two squadrons of llncers 
and a battalion of mounted infantry and scouts. The artillery was in-
creased as well and consisted of "G" battery Royal Horse Artillery, 
the 18th, 62nd and 75th batteries, Field Artillery and two 4.7-inch 
naval guns. The 65th Field Artillery howitzer battery was enroute to 
the Madder River Station on December 9. Its arrival the next day 
increased the number of British guns to thirty-two, including six 
12-pounders, eighteen 15-pounders, six 5-inch howitzers, and two 
34 4.7-inch naval gun~. 
33c. F. MacMunn, "Concerning the Field Howitzer, 11 Proceedings of 
the RoyalArtillery Institution, XXIX ( 1903), pp. 313-314; Par,ons~ .9. 
34 Waters, p. 240. 
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Since the Boer position was approximately eight kilometers from 
Modder River Station, the opportunity for extensive reconnaissance was 
readily available. Unfortunately, Lord Methuen failed to take full 
advantage of the opportunity. The ends of the Boer line had not been 
determined, and the fighting positions were thought to be on the crests 
of the kopjes. On December 9, Methuen ordered one naval gun to gener-
ally bombard the position, and the next day all guns were brought 
forward to add their fire to the kopjes. Using the inadequate recon-
naissance, all the fire was directed at the heights and the reverse 
slopes of the kopje chain. The fire was kept up for several hours, 
sweeping the hills with what one observer called "damnable accuracy." 
Upon the approach of darkness finally the British guns ceased firing, 
but the effort was wasted on target locations that were not the Boer 
position~. 35 Its reported accuracy was probably factual in that the 
artillery hit what they had been told to engage, but they were aiming 
at phantoms. Importantly, the Boers refrained from returning the 
British cannon fire. Even though the British artillery bombardment 
was a reconnaissance by fire to elicit a response and thereby locate a 
profitable target, the Boers steadfastly refused to oblige. Like their 
infantry at the bottom of the hills, the Boer guns were entrenched, 
covered and camouflaged in defilade, and they were virtually untouched 
by the British gunners. Safe in their covered trenches, the night 1 s 
36 
rest prepared them for the ordeal the next dar. 
35 · MacMunn, p. 314. 
36 U.S. War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, Second 
(Mil~tary Information) Division, Selected Translation Pertainin6 to 
the~War, p~ 158. 
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The next morning, the advance to the attack position began before 
dawn. The Boers, however, were not surprised and were fully prepared 
for the expected onslaught. On the right, the Highland Brigade, ad-
vancing on a narrow front and in a deep column, was engaged by Boer 
riflemen and turned back before they could deploy in skirmishers and 
get into assault position. On the left, the Guards Brigade was ad-
vanced forward, but it too was repulsed. The Boers had yet to fire 
their artillery, and succeeded in inflicting severe casualties by in-
tensive rifle fire alone. Methuen moved the field artillery batteries 
within 1,100 yards, but its shrapnel proved ineffective against the 
well-covered Boer trenches. Late that afternoon, the Boer artillery 
opened fire for the first time. They directed their shrapnel at the 
badly shaken Highland Brigade, which had been removed from the right 
flank and placed in the center of the British line. Totally surprised 
by the hostile artillery, some elements of the brigade bolted and with= 
drew behind their own artillery batteries, leaving them exposed and 
unprotected. It fell to the artillery to absorb the punis~ment of 
rifle and artillery fire, with no opportunity to withdraw. It was 
much easier and more effective to continue firing shrapnel at the 
Boer position, than expose both men and horses in an attempt to limber 
37 
the guns and withdra.y. 
The fighting corttinued very active for most of the day, but 
Methuen's division was unable to take the position. By late evening, 
the shooting had stopped, and by tacit agreement, the British and 
Boers policed the battlefield, removing the wounded and burying the 
37 Ibid., pp. 159-161. 
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dead. W:i,.th the gunfire falling silent, the baggage train and ammuni-
tion column was ordered to return to the Modder River Station. Short~ 
ly thereafter, the remainder of the British force took up the march 
38 
to the r~a)/'o 
Magersfontein was a serious defeat for the British, and losing 
240 killed, 651 wounded and seventy-six missing or captured made it 
d . d h . 39 1.sastrous compare to ot er previous engagementf• The most 
obvious cause of the defeat was inadequate reconnaissance. This 
shortcoming yielded poor target acquisition information and in turn 
caused the artillery to direct their preparatory fires at non-existent 
positions leaving the real locations untouched. The bombardment be-
came a reconnaissance by fire, and that was a poor substitute at best. 
Unlike the engagement at Madder River, Methuen had almost two weeks 
to perform a thorough, painstaking reconnaissance, but he had failed 
to do so. Whether this was a conscious failing cannot be adequately 
determined, but the fact remains that decisions regarding deployment 
of forces and tactics employed were based upon inadequate information. 
The artillery preparation fired on the day preceding the assault 
was a wasted effort. Not only was it directed at assumed locations 
that were not factually identified, but also the absence of any 
coordinated offensive action by maneuver elements in its wake negated 
its effect. The delay during the night of December 10, allowed the 
Boers to rebuild any destruction as well as recover from the morale 
effect of the bombardment. Without immediate offensive action in 
38 Waters, pp. 109-110. 
39 Amery, Vol. VII, App. III, p. 24. 
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conjunction with artillery fires, the preparation alone was ineffective. 
Without maneuver elements functioning in concert with artillery, th~ 
;' 
I· 
abyss of disaster opened wider. The idea that artillery was an a~s!ult 
force rather than a support element seemed to be followed. It was 
apparent that the artillery was expected to so stun the enemy that the 
infantry advance would be an easy afternoon stroll. Obviously too 
much was expected. 
Finally, the high hopes for lyddite had not proven as devastating 
as had been expected, and shrapnel shell against covered positions was 
virtually useless. Lyddite functioned well against buildings, destroy-
ing them easily, but in open terrain and surface targets its effect 
was too local, causing only a crater in the soil and little or no frag-
. 40 
menta-t1on. 
All things considered, the defeat at Ma.gersfontein was due entire-
ly to poor reconnaissance, and a lack of initiative on the part of 
General Methuen to obtain complete information. Obviously this short-
coming, which had been identified in peace time, was due to poor 
training in the art, but General Methuen as connnander must shoulder 
some of the responsibility for failing to demand more complete infor-
• 
mation from reconnaissance. The defeat at Ma.gersfontein caused one 
soldier to write, 11we have been out, we have fought our battle •••• and 
we have returned vanquished •••• The general--Paul Methuen--whom we 
. 41 
all expected to do so much, has lost the confidence of everyone." 
40Ma.cMunn, p. 314; N. B. Inglefield, "Some Remarks on the Royal 
Artillery in the War in South Africa, Chiefly with Reference to Heavy 
Guns in the Field, 11 • Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, 
XXIX (1903), p~ 305. . ·- -- . 
41The Times (January 16, 1900), p. 6. 
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This was probably an isolated opinion, but undoubtedly the defeats at 
Magersfontein and Stormberg were severe blows to the confidence of the 
British soldier, who had never truly confronted defeat in forty years. 
ciearly, the week was getting darker, and soon it would be black. 
The same day Methuen engaged the Boers at Magersfontein, Buller' s 
full compLement- of forces was assembled at Chieveley Camp, a few miles 
south of Colenso and the Tugela River. Four brigades of infantry 
numbering 16,000 men and a composite mounted infantry and cavalry 
brigade of 2,600 men composed the maneuver elements. In support were 
the 7th, 14th, 63rd, 64th and 66th Field Artillery batteries. Addition-
ally, Captain Scott's makeshift gun carriage factory had been busy since 
October, providing two 4.7-inch guns and fourteen long range naval 12-
pounders to Buller's growing force. It was, needless to say, a for-
midable force. 42 
Opposing the British were General Louis Botha and a force of 5,000 
men and five guns, who were determined to hold the line along the 
Tugela River. Painstakingly, they had entrenched and camouflaged po-
sitions along the north bank of the river from Red Hill in the west to 
a hillock named Fort Wylie on the east. Furthermore, they had occupied 
a lone kopje, called Hlangwane Hill, which was situated on the British 
' d f h ' f F W 1 ' 43 s1 e o t e river, east o ort y ieo 
On December 15, after the heights across the Tugela River had been 
continuously bombarded by the naval guns for two days, Buller began 
42Th T' . 
. e 1mes (January 17, 1900), p. 4 • 
43u. s. War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, Second 
(Military Information) Division, Selected Translations Pertaining to 
the Boer War, p. 149. 
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his attack. Using a three brigade front and a cavalry regiment 
screening the right flank, the British advanced in the quiet of the 
early morning. The Fifth Brigade with the 63rd and 64th Field 
Artillery batteries on the left had the mission to ford the Tugela 
River approximately three miles west of Colenso. The Second Brigade 
in the middle supported by the 14th and 66th Field Artillery batteries 
along with six naval 12-pounders was given the Colenso bridge as an 
objective. On the right, the Sixth Brigade and the cavalry regiment 
were to advance against Hlangwane Hill, which enfiladed the surrounding 
. 44 kopj es on the north bank of the n. yer. 
On paper the plan appeared comprehensive, but almost as quickly 
as the engagement began, disaster struck. Just after daybreak the 14th 
and 66th batteries, supporting the Second Brigade moved into a position 
800 yards short of the Tugela River and east of the town. The two 
batteries were only 1,200 yards from Fort Wylie, and almost one mile 
ahead of the infantry brigade they were designated to support. They 
were obviously unprotected by any escort elements. The target was too 
tempting, and immediately the Boers began a murderous small arms fire 
directed at the two batteries, which were caught in the open, not yet 
unlimbered or prepared to fire. The small arms fire immediately took 
·. 45 
a heavy toll in gunners and hor,~s. Soon, Boer artillery from 
positions near Fort Wylie were brought to bear on the stranded guns 
and gunners. However, the British gunners still managed to unlimber 
and engage the Boers, but the courageous effort was for naught. Soon 
44The Times (January 17, 1900), p. 4. 
45Ibid. 
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nearly &11 the men and horses were killed and the guns were aba-ndon~d.46 
Meanwhile, the Fifth Brigade on the left had come under heavy fire 
from Boers on R~d Hill and Grobler's Kloof, where two Creusot Long Toms 
were positioned. The Boer artillery was creating havoc, and the rifle 
fire from positions along the river bank was terrifying. To add even 
more to the terror the Boers were so well concealed that "not a single 
head was even visible." The battlefield consisted of 11"Q.othing but a 
long line of smoke, scarcely visible, and the incessant ro,-r-. 1147 
The naval guns engaged Fort Wylie in an effort to extnact the 14th 
and 66th batteries, and the Fifth's brigade division could not range 
the Long Tom positions. In view of these two nearly simultaneous 
disasters, Buller ordered a retirement at 1030 hours. Unfortunately, 
elements of the Fifth Brigade, which had advanced to the river bank, 
were pinned down and unable to comply with the order. They along with 
48 ten 15-pounders of the 14th and 66th batteries were captu:l!'E:id• 
On December 15, the action at Colenso ended Black Week. Three 
definitive defeats had been handed the British and their offensive had 
stalled. The relief of Kimberley, Mafeking and Ladysmith was in doubt. 
At Colenso, the experience at Magersfontein was repeated. Buller had 
the heights bombarded for two days, but the Boers had cautiously re-
fused to reply, keeping their artillery concealed. 11We had no idea 
46u. S. War Department Adjutant General's Office, "Extracts from 
the Reports of Captain S. L'H. Slocum, Eighth Cavalry, on the Operations 
of the British Army," R~ports -~-Military_ Operations in South Africa and 
China, 1901, p. 14. 
47 Ibid., p. 12; The Times (January 17, 1900), P• 4. 
48 . Ibid.; U.S. War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, Second 
(Military Information) Division, Selected Translations Pertaining to 
The~ War, p~ 149. 
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where it [the Boer artillery] was until the battle was begun," ex-
. 49 plained one British officer. The Boers also refused to occupy the 
crests of the kopjes, and just as they had done at Magersfontein, the 
burghers had dug covered and camouflaged trenches along the base of the 
mountains. Since the Boers were not replying to his bombardment, Bul-
ler apparently assumed they had no artillery, and that the Boers were 
50 
not inclined to defend the position in strength, 
The eagerness of the 14th and 66th batteries resulted in their 
pushing too quickly and too far in advance of the Second Brigade. They 
essentially outran their own security in their haste to occupy a favor-
able firing position. Obviously, coordination between infantry and 
artillery elements had not been thoroughly effected. The zeal dis-
played was admirable, but it was rewarded by annihilation before 
51 they were in position to defend themselves. 
Reconnaissance at Colenso was obviously lacking, but moreover, 
the importance of camouflage and deception to frustrate reconnaissance 
efforts was vividly portrayed. Camouflage, combined with weapons using 
smokeless powder, contributed to the success of the hidden Boers, and 
the combination markedly affected target acquisition and troop morale. 
The Boers had proven themselves masters of the art of concealment, and 
as one observer stated, 11 •••• scarcely a man who fought in the fight. ••• 
52 
can say with truth that he saw a Bofr," 
49c. Holmes Wilson, "The War: The Artillery at Colenso," Journal 
of the United States Artillery, XIII (1900), p. 12. 
50The Times (January 17, 1900), p. 4. 
51wilson, "The War: The Artillery at Colenso," p. 193. 
52Ibid., p. 192. 
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The Boer artillery easily ranged the British guns, but except for 
the naval guns which concentrated on Fort Wylie, the British field 
pieces could not reach the Boer positions. The Boer pieces, in addi-
tion to the Long Toms, were Creusot i4-pounders, which claimed a 
shrapnel _range to 4,500 yards and a maximum range of 8,700 yards. Some 
53 Boer shrapnel shell had been found fused for 5, 200 yardli1. The 
British field pieces were effectively out-ranged 1,000 yards. Fortu-
nately for the British, however, a large number of Boer shrapnel rounds 
had failed to burst and this factor, solely by accident, saved the 
British from suffering even more casualties. For military authorities, 
the prospects were sobering, assuming the Boers had attempted to ob-
. ff. . f 54 tain a more e icient use. 
At Colenso the long range guns had come of age. Natal and the 
Cape Colony possessed terrain and climatic conditions that were par-
55 ticularly adaptable to the use of long range g~n~. The wide rambling 
plains dotted by butte-like kopjes which conunanded the surrounding 
terrain, coupled with an unusually clear atmosphere which extended the 
observation distance, was most suited to the long range guns. One ob-
server noted that at Colenso the Boers could observe "every movement 
on the plain below •••• even stones were clearly visible on the ground." 
Another officer warned his troops of the "excessive clearness" of the 
53 Godfrey L. Carden, "British and Boer Guns: A Lesson from the 
South African War," Journal of the United States Artillery, XIII 
(1900), pp. 200-201. 
54wilson, "The War: The Artillery at Colenso, 11 p. 193. 
55Ibid. 
56 African air, and a gunner described the air as "exquisitely cle21-r." 
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It was excellent country for long range guns, and the British were not 
prepared for their employment. 
Aside from the presence of long range guns in South Africa, the 
Boers' ingenious use of camouflage, coupled with smokeless weapons 
were the crucial points in the losses suffered by the British. The 
notable failures in reconnaissance throughout the campaign was a glar-
ing fault in the British Army in all theaters. Its failure inevitably 
led to failure on the battlefield. The poor information derived from 
inadequate reconnaissance caused equally poor tactical decisions to 
be made, and it further allowed artillery to expend countless rounds 
on would-be targets. The failure of the artillery preparatory fires 
at Magersfontein and Colenso was due primarily to poor target acqui-
sition, reconnaissance and failure to take immediate offensive action 
in conjunction with the artillery fires. The lack of coordinated 
effort on the part of all elements effectively cancelled each otherVs 
efforts. 
For the Royal Regiment, however, the courage and audacity of the 
gunners was unsurpassed, and tangibly they were credited with the 
successes at Talana Hill, Elandslaagte, Madder River and the Stormberg 
withdrawal. · Clearly, if the Regiment had been less successful, all 
engagements could have easily been disasters. However, the Boers had 
demonstrated the importance of quick-firing guns. Although their fire 
56c. Holmes Wilson, "Tactics: With the Artillery in Natal," 
Journal of the United States Artillery, XV (1901), p. 198; Waters, p. 
250; Erskine Childres, In the Ranks of the C. I. V.: A Narrative and 
Diary of Personal. Experien"Zes with the £• [." y_-; (Hono;rable Artillery 
Company) in South Africa (London: Smith, Elder and Company, 1901)~ p. 
61-62. 
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was predominately ineffective physically, the volume of fire at its 
extended ranges had considerable effect upon the morale of British 
troops. Undoubtedly, the range limitations of the British 12-pounder 
and 15-pounder field guns were defects that had to be corrected. It 
should be noted, however, that the British field guns were not de-
signed to engage siege guns, and their range limitations were more 
notable when they were forced to engage the mobilized big guns possessed 
by the Boers. The longer range of small arms, which were capable of 
engaging the enemy at ranges in excess of 1,000 yards and making the 
advance more hazardous for all elements, also complicated the achieve-
ment of complete fire support. The lack of concentration of artillery 
fires at the decisive point and time further complicated overall 
British efforts, and clearly demonstrated a lack of coordination as 
well as poor understanding of the Regiment's capabilities. For the 
British, the importance of improved reconnaissance and swift tactical 
employment to cope with the craftiness and mobility of the Boers was 
uppermost. To achieve success demanded leadership and ingenuity in 
employment of all forces, including the artillery. - In the meantime, 
the Royal R~giment was capable of fabricating interim longer ranged 




Tactically, insufficient reconnaissance and the presence of Boer 
long range guns were the significant features affecting the Royal Regi-
ment's participation during the first phase of the war. Strategically, 
Buller's decision to split his forces into three columns effectively 
diffused the necessary preponderance of forces required to generate 
an offensive. The results were explicit. The British were capable 
of tactical advance, but they did not possess sufficient military 
power to generate a strategic offensive that would compel the Boers to 
enter a retrograde movement and redistribute their forces. In the 
end, the limited forces coupled with the inherent weaknesses in train-
ing and preparedness led to disaster, culminating in Black Week. 
The second and decisive phase of the war, however, illustrated 
opposite characteristics of the first period. The appointment of Lord 
Roberts as commander in chief on December 18, and the injection of 
large numbers of troops soon gave the British the strategic edge. By 
February, 1900, they launched a strong offensive. Tactically, Roberts 
adopted the employment of infantry in widespread extended lines, avoid-
ing concentrated formations of troops. For the artillery, the new 
widespread tactics demanded that mobility remain an integral part of 
their participation, but moreover, the experiences of the first phase 
of the war required the Regiment to dismount guns of position from their 
61 
parapets and make them mobile as well. The presence of garrison guns 
in concert with the smaller field guns complemented each other on the 
battlefield and gave new flexibility to the commander. The offensive 
period from February, 1900, to the occupation of Pretoria in June, 
62 
1900, demonstrated the effects of coordinated efforts between artillery 
units and maneuver elements. Furthermore, the offensive period clear-
ly demonstrated the Regiment's ability to adapt to the situation and 
modify its employment methods. 
For the Boers the offensive was the beginning of the decisive act 
of the war, and according to some Boer prisoners taken later in the 
conflict, they "dated their debacle from Roberts' arrival, and the use 
of flanking movements with large numbers of Ifien. 111 Finally, the 
offensive compelled those more recalcitrant Boers to take to the hills 
and indulge in a guerrilla war of sorts, that held no hope of success. 
Clearly, the Boers were on the altar of defeat after the first engage-
ment of the offensive. 
The first confrontation of major importance occurred only six days 
after the offensive began on February 11, 1900, and it was in the end 
the decisive engagement of the entire war. After carefully and secre-
tively assembling three infantry divisions, a cavalry division, two 
brigades of mounted infantry and ninety-two guns in the vicinity of 
Graspan, Roberts put his plan into action. The scheme called for Lord 
Methuen and his veteran 1st Division to maintain their positions at 
Magersfontein, and hold the Boers' western theater commandant, Piet 
Cronje, and his 7,000 troops in position. While this diversion was 
1childers, p. 118. 
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being carried out in conjunction with other similar activities con-
ducted by independent elements around Colesberg and Stormberg, Roberts 
planned to move his force east paralleling the course of the Riet 
2 River to Jacobsdal, and then turn abruptly north. 
On February 13, the cavalry division under the command of General 
John French turned north about five miles east of Jacobsdal, crossed 
the Riet River, and advanced to the Modder River. The next day at 
about 0900 hours, .the cavalry division, having been joined by the 6th 
Infantry Division at the Modder River, departed west to relieve 
3 Kimberley, arriving there the next d~y. 
Cronje was apparently surprised when he began receiving reports 
that British elements in addition to Methuen were crossing the Riet 
River. When on February 16, he was informed of the presence of the 
British cavalry in Kimberley he ordered a withdrawal of all his forces 
to Bloemfontein, the Free State capit~l. 4 He had waited too long, 
however, and on February 17, while resting his force near Paardeberg he 
found himself cornered in the bed of the Modder River by French 1 s 
cavalry division, which had moved into position northeast of the Boer 
encampment.. French, with two batteries of Horse Artillery, immedi-
ately engaged the Boers at 3,300 yards. Although it was a British 
2u. s. War Department, Adjutant GeneralV s Office, "Extracts from 
the Reports of Captain s. LIH. Slocum, Eighth Cavalry, on the Opera-
tions of the British Army, 11 Reports ~ Military .operations in South 
Africa and China, 1901, pp. 22-25. 
3Ibid., p. 25. "The weather· was extremely hot, about 110°, in the 
shade, and there was no time to water mounts." J. E. Caunter, "From 
Eni:,lin to Bloemfontein with the 6th Division, 11 The Royal United Service 
Institution Journal, XLIV (1900), p. 1144. 
4 Parsons, p. 14. 
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trap, precariously French was alone at the time, and the 
reinforcing infantry divisions were still some distance away. Moreover, 
French's movement beginning early in the morning of February 17, had 
5 
covered nearly twenty miles in half a day and his mounts were ~~ent. 
Cronje apparently thought he could storm the position and break out 
or at least escape the trap. However, the Royal Horse Artillery bat-
teries were within their efficient shrapnel range and they succeeded 
not only in repulsing the attacks by the now desperate Boers, but also, 
covered escape attempts with their deadly fires. The Boers on the 
other hand received a taste of their own tactics and found that frontal 
attack was just as difficult for them as it had been for the British 
only two months earlier. During the course of events of February 17, 
however, French undoubtedly kept a concerned and watchful eye on the 
southern horizon, hoping the infantry divisions would arrive before the 
6 prize he had trapped succeeded in one of their assa¥,lts. 
The wait was longer than French had expected, perhaps, but by 1700 
hours that evening the first elements of the 6th Division arrived and 
later the full division closed near the Paardeberg laager at 2130 hours. 
By 2300 hours the 9th Division had closed along with two brigades of 
mounted infantry, and they began completion of the encirclement of the 
5 Waters, pp. 162-164. "He [French] had left Kimberley about 4 a.m. 
···~ In spite of the great heat and notwithstanding the fact that no 
water was to be found during the march, he reached Kameelfontein [north-
east of the Boer column] towards 11 a.m. 11 
6rbid., PP• 164-165. 
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B . . 7 oer position. 
The next morning the British found the Boers deeply entrenched in 
the river bed. Apparently, harkening back to the success at Magers-
fontein, Cronje had decided to defend the camp. Lord Kitchener, chi.ef 
of staff to Lord Roberts, arrived at the scene and began directing 
operations. Unfortunately, ignoring the tragic lessons of Magers-
fontein and Colenso, Kitchener began ordering various assaults on the 
Boer defenses. The results were predictably unsuccessful, and by the 
8 
end of the day 212 British were killed and 932 were wound~d. 
The next morning, February 19, Roberts departed his headquarters 
at Jacobsdal, and arrived at the encirlced Boer camp at 1030 hours. He 
quickly called a halt to any further assault attempts and communicated 
to Cronje an immediate demand for his surrender. Initially, the Boer 
general seemed to agree, but at 1515 hours, as British elements began 
moving toward the Boer laager under a flag of truce to accept prison-
ers, the Boers opened fire. Shortly the~eafter, Roberts received 
Cronjets rejection advising the British general that, "if you wish to 
9 bombard, fire ,N'fl'ifY•" 
\ ' 
7u. s. War Department, Adjutant General's Office, "Extracts of the 
Reports of Captains. L1 H. Slocum, Eighth Cavalry, on the Operations of 
the British Army." Reports .. ~. Military __ Operations in South Africa and 
China, 1901, pp. 27-28. 
81bid., p. 31; Parsons, PP• 14-15; Amery, Vol. VII, App. III, po 
24. Total British casualties for the ten day operation at Paardeberg 
were 348 killed, 1133 wounded, and fifty-eight missing. Obviously, 
the vast majority of casualties suffered by the British i.n the action 
were the result of Kitchener's questionable decision to assault the 
entrenched Boers during the activities on February 18. 
9u. S. War Department, Adjutant General's Office, "Extracts of · 
the Reports of Captain S. L1 H. Slocum, Eighth Cavalry, on the Opera-
tions of the British Army," Reports on Military Operations in South 
Africa and~, 1901, p. 29. 
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Cronje's decision set the stage for the British artillery's first 
opportunity to concentrate its fires. On the north side of the Boer 
camp, one 5-inch howitzer battery, three 4.7-inch and one 12-pounder 
naval guns, and three batteries of Field Artillery were positioned. 
On the south were one 4.7-inch and three 12-pounder naval guns, and 
three Field Artillery batteries. French's Horse Artillery batteries 
remained in place northeast of the laager. Roberts went further to 
facilitate the bombardment by issuing an order on February 20~ stipu-
lating that all batteries would be ordered to fire only by himself or 
Lord Kitchener. The only exception to the rule were those actions 
10 
taken to defend a position or in a prearranged assa-l\lt,:. While the 
bombardment was being conducted, infantry elements began digging 
trenches around the Boer embattlement, and nightly the trenches were 
progressively advanced nearer and nearer the hostile laa~~f·ll 
" i• 1 · 
' The s;i.ege.·at Paardeberg Drift lasted from February 20, through 
,, 
February 27; however, the arti·llery bombardment plan that seemed to 
promise concentrated fire was not fully accomplished. On the first 
day of shelling, February 20, all guns began firing at 0600 hours, but 
on the next day, the British were concerned with a relief attempt by 
other Boer elements against the southeast quadrant of the Brittsh 
" 
cordon. On February 22, the artillery fired only occasionally on the 
trenches and wagons. The next day another Boer relief column was re-
pulsed with the burghers losing 154 killed and wounded and 102 cap-
tured~ The artillery, in the meantime, shelled the laager at 
lOibid., p. 6.3. 
11rbid., p. 31. 
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"irregular intervals" that day. On February 24, there was little 
firing again, but the British did discover the Boer anununition wagons, 
which the 4.7-inch guns quickly exploded. The following day was Sun-
day, and there was no firing. On February 25, three Vickers-Maxim 
12\-pound~r quick-firing guns manned by the City of London Imperial 
Volunteers [c. I. v.J arrived along with four 6-inch garrison howitzers. 
At 1630 hours General French fired his Horse Artillery batteries con-
12 
tinuously for an ho~r. 
Early in the morning of February 27, the Royal Canadians on the 
north advanced the British trenches to a point ninety yards from the 
Boer lines. This fact combined with the Boers consuming their last 
ration the day before and the pre'sence of the 6-inch howitzers which 
had fired upon the Boers shortly after arrival, apparently convinced 
the Boers to surrender. General Piet Cronje and 4,010 Boers surrend-
ered to the British, and the decisive battle in the western theater had 
13 been fou~ht. 
It was sweet victory for the British, because as one observer 
noted, 11 Cronj e had thrown up the sponge •••• and it was the dawn of 
the nineteenth anniversary of Majul;}a,! 1114 Although the surrender of 
Cronje at Paardeberg Drift was the decisive victory in the protracted 
phase of the Boer War, and only splintered resistance could subse-
quently be mounted by the burghers, the conduct of the bombardment 
12Ibid., p. 33-36. 
13Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
14caunter, p. 1149. The British had suffered a resounding defeat 
at the hands of the Boers at Majuba Hill in Natal on February 27, 1881, 
and at the beginning of the Boer War "Remember Majuba" was a popular 
rallying cry. 
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cannot be considered a total success. By the end of the bombardment, 
ninety-eight guns were present and all were positioned within easy 
range of the laager. The British, however, as illustrated in the 
course of events, only concentrated all their guns on the first day of 
the bombardment. The distractions by Boer elements attempting to re-
lieve the besieged camp were capably handled by the Mounted Infantry 
and Horse Artillery batteries, and they did not substantially drain 
that much fire power away from the whole force. The captured Boers 
voiced no fears of lyddite; however, a continuous bombardment by the 
eigh~een big guns capable of using the shells that were at Roberts' 
disposal, although not creating much physical damage, undoubtedly 
ld h b . 15 wou ave een unnerving·. Furthermore, there apparently was no 
difficulty in supply or security of the supply lines. Illustrative 
of this conclusion was the fact that 100 ration and supply wagons 
16 
arrived at the British position on February 21. Therefore econo-
mizing was not the excuse for the reduced fire. All things considered, 
every thing necessary to concentrate the fires decisively was present, 
and failure to do so conceivably extended the siege~ 
On the other hand, there were several important positive features 
that were revealed at Paardeberg. Mobility was exemplified to the 
fullest by French's two Horse Artillery batteries in the march from 
Kimberley to" Paardeberg. His horses were absolutely spent when he 
discovered the Boers, and Cronje could have outrun the British had he 
15Ibid., p. 1150. 
16 ·. 
U. S. War Department, Adjutant General's Office, "'Extracts of 
the Reports of Captain S. L'H. Slocum, Eighth Cavalry, on the Operations 
of the British Army," Reports on. Military Operations in South Africa and 
China, 1901, p. 33. 
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known it. His attempts to assault the cavalry, however, were repulsed 
by the Horse Artillery and the dismounted cavalry troops, who apparent-
ly found a use for their rifles. Cronje's escape attempts were equally 
halted by effective shrapnel fire of the Horse Artillery batteries. 
Their successful em~foyment was the key to confining and holding the 
Boer force in the river bed until additional forces arrived to close 
the circle. 
Other positive features included the arrival of three Vickers-
Maxim 12~-pounderi;;, and although limited in number, they indicated that 
some effort was being made to provide newer field gun~. 17 The presence 
of the 6-inch howitzers mounted on a fabricated and impromptu mount-
ings and towed by teams of oxen numbering more than twenty-four in 
some cases, also indicated that the Regiment was prepared to adapt to 
the situation in South Africa. Notwithstanding the excellent service 
rendered by the naval guns and crews, all three elements of the Royal 
' Regiment, the Royal Horse, the Royal Field and the Royal Garrison 
Artillery were present on the mobile battlefield, and this gave more 
flexibility of response and easier coordination to the 
17childers, p. 28. The C. I. V. returned to England in October, 
1900, and since the Vickers-Maxim battery was composed of only four 
of the guns, there limited employment correspondingly reduced any 




An excellent example of the flexibility afforded by the presence 
of all three elements of the Royal Regiment was provided by General 
Buller 1 s forces operating in Natal during the same time frame as 
Roberts' offensive in the western area. Buller, in January, was still 
based at Chieveley Camp and stubbornly, he was still attempting to 
cross the Tugela River to gain access to Ladysmith. In late January, 
he had attempted to turn the Boer western flank, but he was repulsed 
at an action near Spion Kop on January 25. Still.determined to turn 
one or the other Boer flanks and cross the Tugela he directed his 
attention to the Boer left flank, east of Colenso. 
General Louis Botha, cormnander of the Boers in Natal, had es-
tablished a strong position in that area as well. The Boer lines ex-
tended from a westernmost point at Groblers Kloff, east across the 
Tugela River along Hlangwane Hill to a kopje named Monte Cristo. 
Unfortunately, the line had a weakness. The Tugela River cut the 
18 T. C. Goff, "Short Description of the Improvised Travelling Car-
riage for 6-inch, Q. F. Guns," Proceedings£!. the Royal Artillery In-
stitution, XXIX (1903), pp. 158-160. Even though the author q~scribed 
the C<!lrriage as "improvised, 11 it was remarkably well-suited for move-
ment in South Africa. The 6-inch gun and er.idle were mounted to a 
"top carriage" which in turn was bolted to a "slide." When in firing 
position, the gun and "top carriage" rested squarely on the two front 
carri~ge wheels, with the "slide" functioning as the gun trail. On 
the move the ''top carriage" and gun were moved to the center of the 
~'slide" and a travelling limber was hitched to the end of the trail. 
In this configuration, the 6-inch gun distributed its weight equally 
on the two wheels of the limber and those of the carriage. The impro-
vised carriage allowed the heavy gun to move easily as well as avoid 
becoming struck as frequently as was the case with other big guns. 
N. B. Inglefield in "Some Remarks on the Royal Artillery in the War in 
South Africa, Chiefly with Reference to Heavy Guns in the Field," 
Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, XXIX (1903) p. 504, 
criticizes the 4.7-inch garrison gun carri~ge for is imperfect balance, 
noting that "over four tons are taken on two wheels." In this condi-
tion he adds that the gun easily became bogged down, and had been 
known to "sink to its axle tree and 'even further." 
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position in half between Groblers Kloff and Hlangwane Hi.11, and Buller 
decided to gain possession of Hlangwane Hill, which enfiladed the Boers 
19 
on the opposite bank of the Tug~la. In preliminary movement to con-
duct his planned operation, Buller on February 15, ordered five naval 
12-pounders and two newly arrived mobile 5-inch garrison guns, manned 
by the 6th Southern Garrison Artillery Company, to occupy a position 
. 20 
on a low lying hill south of Monte Cr1.1;Jto. 
'; 
The next morning, the bi.g guns began a bombardment of the Boer 
trenches, which brought an immediate response from a Boer 40-pounder 
that could not be observed. However, the response was negated by em-
ployment of the Boer tactic of entrenching and covering gun positionso 
On February 17, the bombardment began again and this elicited a re-
sponse not only from the hidden 40-pounder, but a Long Tom spoke as 
well. Unfortunately for the Boer gunners, the Long Tom used smoke 
powder, and sixteen British big guns quickly engaged the Boer gun and 
21 
si,lenced it. 
The following morning, February 18, the infantry stormed up the 
east side of Monte Cristo. The 5-inch guns, now four in number, along 
with the naval guns opened fire at 8,000 yards on preplanned targets 
beyond the crest of Monte Cristo, where supposedly encampments and 
trenches were located. In -the-'ffieantime, howitzer-s worked over the 
19wilson, "Tactics: With the Artillery in Natal," p. 199. 
20 c. E. Callwell, "A Heavy Battery at the Relief of Ladysmith, 11 
Proceedings _of the _Royal Artillery Institution, XXVII (1901), p. 137. 
21 . Ibid., pp. 139-140. 
the practice [British term 
and from the appearance of 
some of the detachment had 
11A visit to the emplacement •••• showed that 
for firing] at it had been very accurate, 
the ground, and the smell, it looked as if 
stopped there for good. 11 
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forward slopes of the hill. By arrangement, the artillery fire ceased 
after forty-five minutes of continuous shelling. The results were im-
mediate, and the Boers began withdrawing to the Tugela as the British 
infantry advanced up the hill. The decision to make the withdrawal 
was a costly one for the Boers. In their haste to reach the safety of 
the Tugela River, they were forced to pass directly in front of pre-
positioned field batteries who quickly and efficiently brought very 
22 
effective shrapnel fire to bear on the exposed Bo~r~. 
Three days,, later on February 21, the British were in possession 
of Hlangwane Hill, and they spent the next five days trying to establish 
a defensible bridgehead across the Tugela. Finally, on February 27, the 
same day Cronje capitulated to Roberts, the final act to secure the 
bridgehead and clear the Colenso area of Boer resistance occurred. A 
strong Boer position on Pieters Hill, lying north of Hlangwane Hill, 
across the Tugela River, and overlooking the road to Ladysmith was the 
objective. Seventy guns, varying in size from the small 2.5-inch 
mountain gun to the huge 5-inch garrison gun were assembled on Hlang-
wane Hill forming "one great battery." There were so many guns, in 
fact, that some were double tiered on the hillside, and all were 
threateningly aimed at Pieters Hill. 23 
The operation conunenced by a slow and occasional firing of the 
artillery, as three infantry brigades cautiously advanced to positions 
22Ibid., P• 140. 
23rbid., p. 142. "The artillery consisted of one horse artillery 
battery, six 15-paunder field batteries, one howitzer battery, one 
mountain battery, and my four guns [5-inch garrison guns]. Besides 
these there were four naval 4.7-inch guns •••• and •••• eight naval 12-
pounder Q. F.'s.•i 
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in the river bed. Finally, when all elements were in position, the 
massed artillery began firing lyddite and shrapnel with ferocity. As 
the infantry advanced on the hill from three directions in widespread 
skirmishes, the artillery increased its rate of fire, until the last 
moment before the final assault began. At that moment the artillery 
by prearrangement ceased firing, and the infantry easily stormed the 
position. The next morning the Boers were observed in retreat, and 
elements of Buller' s cavalry arrived at Ladysmith, raising th-e"'1S{ce~e.24 
Although it may be suggested that Cronj e 1 s fall on February 27 
made it easier for Buller 1 s troops to take Pieters Hill on the same 
day, it was equally true that Buller 1 s activity contributed to Cronje 1 s 
downfall. By occupying the attention of Boer elements in Natal, Buller 
eliminated the possibility of strong relief columns being dispatched 
to the western theater. This was in marked contrast to the dis-
jointed and independent actions of the first phase of the war. 
From an artillery point of view, Buller's employment of the 5-inch 
garrison guns in a well-coordinated and prearranged engagement success-
fully pushed the Boers from Monte Cristo and later across the Tugelao 
More importantly, all his guns were employed efficiently. The big 
guns fired lyddite at long range targets, the howitzers were employed 
on closer range trenches, and the field guns fired their shrapnel on 
exposed troops, precisely as they were designed to do. In the wake 
of the fires came the infantry, who successfully expelled the enemy. 
Later at Pieters Hill, similar coordination and efficient employment 
was made of artillery assets by Buller, and close fire support of 
24rbid., p. 142; Coxhead, p. 563. 
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maneuver elements was achieved. 
In both theaters examples of the Regiment's ability to provide 
support were illustrated, and the results of coordinated effort were 
immediate. The surrender of General Cronje and 4,000 veterans was a 
crushing blow to the morale of the Boers, as well as a decisive blow to 
their ability to wage protracted combat. Equally, the relief of 
Kimberley and Ladysmith boosted the morale of the British and added 
more troops to the British in the field and along lines of communica-
tion. Most importantly, the British had penetrated the enemy's home-
land and that augured ill for the Boers and their continued resistance. 
The Boers on the other hand, were not willing to give up without a 
fight. In the western theater, Roberts continued his advance eastward 
toward Bloemfontein after a week 1 s respite around Paardeberg. The first 
attempt -at resi.stance was made at a small village on the Modder River 
known as Poplar Grove. Roberts quickly dispatched French 1 s cavalry 
division to turn the Boer right flank, and he sent the 7th and 9th 
Di vision on similar turning movement_s to the Boerst left. In the 
center, the Guards Brigade and massed artillery advanced toward the 
position. Unwilling to suffer a similar fate as Cronje, the Boers 
. 25 quickly withdrew toward Bloemfont~1p. 
Roberts continued the advance on March 9, and the army marched 
to a kopje chain known as Abraham1 s Kraal, arriving at mid-morning on 
March 10. On the left the 6th Division was confronted by strong Boer 
positions along the Kraal, and in an attempt to turn the flank of the 
position, the British were met by other Boer elements barring their 
25 Gaunter, p. 1153. 
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path. A few rounds of shrapnel caused the Boers to immediately fall 
back to stronger positions in the rear. The battle narrowed down to 
the cavalry division and the 6th Division, who were more severely en-
gaged than the rest of the army. On a limited scale the British attemp-
ted to flank the position. The Boers, apparently observing the en~ 
veloping movement, tried to engage French's cavalry with their artil-
. 26 lery, but the range was too great for effective shrapnel f~r~. 
Undaunted, a British infantry regiment advanced to a center hillock, 
while another regiment occupied the enemy's left. A third regiment 
was drawn in and sent around the left to flank the position. The third 
occupied commanding terrain, and after establishing a superiority in 
rifle fire and inflicting considerable damage by well-directed shrapnel 
fire, the regiment on the enemy's left fixed bayonets and rushed the 
27 
retiring Bol!irfii. The British lost eighty-two killed and 342 wounded 
in the assault at Abraham's Kraal. The next morning, however, the 
British discovered 102 Boer bodies left behind by the retreating 
28 burgh~r~.. Clearly, the Boers had suffered more in the defense of 
the position than they had experienced before in the war, and above 
all, they were on the run. 
Roberts rested portions of his army the next day, while his caval-
26 Ibid. 
27 U. S. War Department, Adjutant General's Office, "Extracts from 
the Reports of Captain S. L'H. Slocum, Eighth Cavalry, on the Opera-
tions of the British Army, 11 Reports.~. Military~ Operations in South 
Africa and China, 1901, p. 45. 
28 Amery, Vol. VII, App. III, p. 24; Gaunter, P• 1153. 
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ry division and the 6th Division continued to press toward the Boer 
. 29 
capital. There was no resistance to speak of and on March 13, 
Roberts at the head of his columns entered the Orange Free State 
capital unmolested. 
Offensive operations in the western theater were curtailed for 
several weeks after the occupation of Bloemfontein, as Roberts began 
a pacification progr~m, reconnoitered the area east and north of 
Bloemfontein, and continued to build up his army. The Boers, however, 
had decided to take the fight to the British. On March 18, at Kroon-
stad in northern Orange Free State, a council of war was held which 
conclud·ed that purely defensive tactics had failed to serve them well. 
It was decided that a vigorous offensive of harrassing attacks and 
quick withdrawals would begin as soon as possibl~. 30 The decision was 
the beginning of the guerrilla activities that soon would become the 
sole activity of the Boers. 
The first success of the new strategy was not long in coming, and 
it became the pattern of other Boer activities. On March 30, two 
regiments of cavalry and two batteries of Horse Artillery were with-
drawing from the Ladybrand area where they had discovered Boer elements 
concentrated in strength. The column reached the Madder River at 
Waterval Drift late in the evening, and crossed the river, establish-
29Gerald French, ed., So~e War Diaries, Addresses and Correspond-
ence of Field MarshaL the ~tHonourable, the Earl of Ypres (Londom 
Herbert Jenkins, Limited, 1937), pp. 16-17. 
30 U. S. War Department, Adjutant General's Office, "Extracts from 
the Reports of Captain Carl Reichmann, Seventeenth Infantry, on the 
Operations of the Boer Army," Reports on Military Operations in South 
Africa and China, 1901, p. 195. 
31 ing a camp some 1,500 yards from the ford at Sanna's Post. 
The Boer general, Christian DeWet, decided to take advantage of 
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the situation, and assembling 1,500 Boers and five Krupp field guns he 
made a forced march to a point approximately 1,200 yards south and west 
of the British camp. Once there, however, he found he had only 400 
men and two guns available, since his remaining force had ~ailed to 
cross the Modder River. DeWet deployed his reduced force along a creek 
that crossed the only road leading south away from the British camp to 
32 Bloemfontein. 
As dawn broke on March 31, the British column arose and entered 
the road proceeding south at a leisurely pace, baggage wagons and 
larger trek wagons leading the column. Notably, there were no out-
riders or forward security elements. DeWet confronted the wagons\ 
rifle in hand, directing them to cross the creek where his soldiers took 
them in tow, parked them off the roadway and gathered up the drivers. 
Soon, however, the wagons became conjested at the crossing and a 
British officer rode forward to investigate. There he discovered DeWet 
and the Boers. He inunediately turned his mount and departed at a 
gallop to warn the remainder of the column, only to be shot down by 
DeWet himself. Inunediately the whole Boer line opened fire. 33 
31u. s. War Department, Adjutant General's Office, "Extracts from 
the Reports of Captains. L'H. Slocum, Eighth Cavalry, on the Operations 
of the British Army,",Reports on Military Operations in South Africa 
and China, 1901, P• 57. 
32 u. S. War Department, Adjutant General's Office, "Extracts from 
the Reports of Captain Carl Reichmann, Seventeenth Infantry, on the 
Operations of the Bo~r Army," Reports on Military Operations in South 
Africa and China, 1901, PP• 199-200. 
33Ibid., P• 201. 
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Fortunately for the British, closely following the wagons were the 
two Horse Artillery batteries, but the initial volleys from the Boers 
put five guns of the leading battery and two of the trailing out of 
action. The remaining guns disengaged and moved to the left and un-
limbered. Turning their guns on the Boer artillery pieces first and 
then on the enemy riflemen, the partial battery kept the Boers at bay, 
allowing the remainder of the column to retire. 34 Courage notwith-
standing, the lack of sufficient scouting and march security had 
caused another tragedy that could have been avoided. The apparent 
lackadaisical attitude cost the British in addition to seven 12-pounder 
field guns left at the scene of the melee, thirty killed, 129 wounded 
35 
and 421 missing or captured. 
Sanna's Post was followed by other isolated successes at Wepner, 
where on April 4, a British column was encircled for twenty days before 
relief arrived, and at Karree Siding where a buildup of Boers threat-
ened the British advance in northern Orange Free State. All the inci-
dents did much to boost morale, but they had not assured success. The 
Boers had assumed an offensive~ of sorts, but lacking sufficient man-
oven,helm a British column, their activities were power to totally 
never decisive. Moreover, Roberts took immediate action in response to 
the increased hostility. On April 9, he declared martial law, and 
promised "extreme penalties" for thos.e Boers discovered participating 
34u. s. War Department, Adjutant General I s Office, "Extracts from 
the Reports of Captain So L'H. Slocum, Eighth Cavalry, on the Opera-
tions of the British Army,". Reports £!! Military Operations in South 
Africa and China, 1901, P• 58. "The action of these gunners was mag-
nificent. In the face of a bitter fire at short range they stood by 
their pieces until of the five gun groups there was only ten men and 
one officer left unwounded. Then with five=horses left and manual 
hauh.ge, they dragged the guns out of action. 11 
35 Amery, Vol. VII, App. III, P• 24. 
36 in the new trou~l~. 
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Meanwhile, Roberts' army continued to grow, as he prepared to move 
on the second leg of the British journey into the Boer homeland. His 
maneuver forces had increased to four infantry divisions, numbering 
24, 000 men, a fourth brigade pushed the cavalry division to 5, 000 men, 
and the mounted infantry became division size by an increase to 9,300 
men. The artillery was increased and redistributed to support the 
maneuver elements. Each cavalry brigade had one Horse Artillery bat-
tery, or twenty-four guns for the division. The mounted infantry di-
vision was alloted two Horse Artillery batteries, or twelve gunso 
The infantry divisions each had three Field Artillery batteries, 
I 
eighteen guns. A Corps Artillery was created, and it was composed of· 
two batteries of Horse Artillery and three batteries of 5-inch howitz-
ers, or thirty guns. Additionally, four 4.7-inch and four 12-pounder 
naval guns were present, along with four 6-inch railway mounted naval 
guns. Finally, waiting at Cape Town for dispatch to the front were 
four 9.45-inch siege guns, manufactured by Skoda of Pilsen, Bohemia. 
. . 37 In all 150 guns were available with four yet to arr1v~. 
On May 1, ~oberts began a general advance toward Kroonstad, build-
ing roads, repairing railroad bridges and distributing security forces 
to guard the vital supply lines as they progressed. In the far west a 
Mafeking relief column and the 10th division advanced along the DeAar-
36u. s. War Department, Adjutant General's Office, "Extracts from 
the Reports of Captains. L1 H. Slocum, Eighth Cavalry, on Operations of 
the British Army," Reports of Military Operations in_South_Africa and 
China, 1901, P• 60. 
37 Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
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Mafk . 'l d All 1 hf · 1· · d 38 e ing rai roa • a ong t e ront resistance was very im:tte • 
On May 17, Mafeking was relieved, and Londoners danced in the streets, 
cheering the gallant garrison and its pugnacious commander, Colonel 
Roberts. S. Baden-Powell. On May 21, Roberts halted his advance just 
short of the Vaal River for four days. There he resupplied his column, 
a:nd allowed the Mafeking garrison to repair after their relief. 
Beginning his advance again, lead elements crossed the Vaal River 
on May 24, and five days later they reached the outskirts of Johannes-
burg. Negotiations for its occupation took two days, and on May 31, 
the British entered the city. Again Roberts halted to prepare for the 
last advance to Pretoria. On June 2, in anticipation that he would 
have to lay siege to -the Transvaal capital, Roberts received two 9.45-
inch siege guns, and the four 6-inch rail mounted naval guns were 
brought forward to the railhead. Wisely, however, the Boers did not 
subject their capital to the tortures of the big guns, and after a 
brief skirmish on the outskirts of the city on June 4, the British 
entered the city the following morning. Roberts and his army marched 
through the streets of Pretoria, which were lined by cheering British 
prisoners who had released themselves after the Boers had departed 
during the night. Clearly, protracted combat was over_in the western 
39 
theater. 
However, Roberts' troubles were not over by any means. Christian 
38rbid., p. 66. 11 The cavalry and mounted infantry would come up 
with the enemy, who had every appearance of being determined to stand, 
and would open a hot fire on the mounted men, but by the time the 
infantry and heavy guns came up and the flanking columns appeared, the 
Boers began their retreat, leaving as a rule, only a small force to 
hold the British, while their wagons and guns were safely retired." 
39rbid., pp. 75-78. 
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DeWet, soon to become the mastermind of Boer guerrilla tactics, had 
returned south of the Vaal River and attacked British supply lines 
around Bloemfontein and Helibron. Dispatching Kitchener to stabilize 
the situation and employing French's cavalry division and Methuen's 
1st Division, along with columns from other divisions, Roberts saw 
d 1 • h h • T,1 40 June an Ju y pass wit out snaring t e wispy De1et. 
The DeWet maneuvers were frustrating and distracting for Roberts, 
who desired to turn his attention to eastern Transvaal. In that area, 
Louis Botha and his main force were withdrawing as Buller advanced 
northward out of Natal into Transvaal. The advance of the British 
in the east had been slower than the western army, but considering the 
mountainous terrain Buller was required to negotiate he had made rapid 
advances. With the fall of Pretoria the advance increased, and by 
late June, Buller had crossed the lower Vaal River and established 
his headquarters at Standerton. On June 30, he dispatched a cavalry 
column and fifteen guns from his headquarters along the Durban-Johannes-
burg railroad to Heidelberg in an effort to contact Roberts' army. 
After a five day march and several isolated skirmishes the column 
arrived at its destination, and the two armies were united. 41 
Roberts began a tactical advance eastward toward Botha on July 19. 
Employing the successful tactics of wide flanking movements on apparent 
strong points, the British advanced rapidly and the Boers withdrew 
offering little resistance~ On July 29, French, having returned from 
the DeWet hunt, entered Middleburg, situated nearly mid-way between the 
40cecil DeSausmarez, "Lord Methuen and the 1st Division, SAFF, 11 
Proceedings £i_ the Royal Artillery Institution, LX (1933), pp. 30-31. 
41The Times (August 6, 1900), p. 13. 
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ends of the Deloga Bay-Pretoria railroad. A week later BullerVs left 
flank advancing northward closed on Middelburg as well, and the British 
42 
tightened the cordon on the Boer,. 
The Boers sought to delay Buller from advancing further and they 
began attacking his supply lines in the south, but by August 23, Buller 
had establis~ed his headquarters at Carolina, and had continueq his 
movement northward. Three days later, Roberts was twenty-five miles 
east of Midde1burg. Elements of Bullers army occupied Belfast, and 
French was in the vicinity of Lydenburg north of the railread. 43 
The Boers were literally being forced out of the country, east 
into the Portuguese territory bordering Transvaal. Resistance was 
becoming more determined, however, as the British neared the Boer 
headquarters at Machadodorp. The strongest position at Bergendal fell 
within the purview of Buller' s forces. Situated at the base of two 
high kopjes that commanded the terrain, it appeared that the British 
were going to have a difficult fi~ht. 44 
i 
Buller ordered all his guns to open fire at 1000 hours on August 
27, and they complied with rapidity. 45 For the Boers defending the 
town it was a terrifying experience as guns from three directions began 
a mercilous shelling. Unable to locate the British guns the Boers 
could not effectively return fire, although a Long Tom fired an occas-
sional round. To the Boers it was "the spectacle of modern war with 
42John P. Wisser, "The Second Boer War, 11 Journal Ei.. the United 
States Artillery, XV (1901), pp. 31·32. 
43 Ibid., p. 154. 
44Ibid. 
45The ~ (August 30, 1900), p. 3. 
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smokeless powder." Their enemy remained hidden, and undoubtedly they 
felt the frustration and terror that the British had witnessed at 
Colenso. For the defenders of Bergendal on that day the battle 
was only the "tremendous roar of artillery and bursting shells, and 
not a human being was in sight anywhere." The Boers were simply out-
numbered and outgunned, and at 1400 hours they were compelled to with-
draw. The British quickly stormed the town and occupied it with very 
. l . 46 minor casua ties. 
For the Boers and the British, Bergendal was the last major en-
gagement of the protracted war. In the evening after the defeat the 
Boers moved their headquarters out of Machadodorp, and the next morn-
ing advanced elements of Buller's army entered the town, hot on the 
47 
trail of the retreating and badly beaten Bo~r~. The following day, 
the retreating burghers were at Nooitgedacht, where 2,000 British 
prisoners were held. Unable to quarter them any longer, the Boers 
decided to release the enlisted captives, sending the officers to 
48 Barberton. 
The government in exile decided to join the guerrilla elements 
north of Pretoria, but the President, Paul Kruger, was too ill for 
the punishing trip that would be made. It was decided to turn the 
46 Ibid.; U. s. War Department, Adjutant Generali s Office, "Ex-
tracts from the Reports of Captain Carl Reichmann, Seventeenth Infantry, 
on the Operations of the Boer Army, 11 Reports on Military Operations in 
South Africa and China, 1901, pp. 231-236. 
47 The Times (August 30, 1900), p. 3. 
48 u. s. War Department, Adjutant Generali s Office, "Extracts from 
the Reports of Captain Carl Reichmann, Seventeenth Infantry, on the 
Operations of the Boer Army, 11 Reports ~ Military Operations in South 
Africa and China, 1901, p~ 238. 
reins of government over to Schalk Burgher, the Vice President, and 
send Kruger east to the safety of Lourenco Marques in the Portuguese 




Under the guidance of Christian DeWet, the Boers striking at 
camps and installations throughout the countryside occupied the time 
and efforts of the British Army until May, 1902. Unfortunately, the 
new guerrilla tactics held no hope of decisive victory, but the 
marauding bands of Boer riders did their best to create as much diffi-
culty as possible. There were hundreds of fights, pitched battles, 
melees and brief skirmishes, and each side had its share of success and 
failure. In the end, the massive manpower and money of England was too 
much for the Boers to overcome and they reluctantly agreed to peace on 
May 31, 1902. 
For the British, combating the Boer guerrilla bands was a frus-
trating and hazardous task. To cope with the numerous bands of mounted 
burghers, the British divided their forces into small mounted columns. 
Crisscrossing the countryside in varied directions, the British columns 
attempted to engage the Boers in some decisive manner. However, even 
for the British, a clear cut victory continued to evade them, and on 
occasion they suffered tragic losseso An example of such a loss 
occurred on December 13, 1900. 
On that date a British column numbering 1,200 men and nine guns 
was encamped near a farm nestled at the base of the Magaliesberg Hills, 
some forty miles west of Pretoria. Secure in the thought that their 
49 rbid., pp. 238-239. 
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infantry elements in the hills were well prepared for any Boer attack, 
the British had spent a peaceful night resting from a long trek across 
the veldt. The Boers, however, quickly burst the dreamy scene early 
in the morning by first attacking the west side of the camp, and then 
overwhelming the British infantry in the hills. Soon the whole camp 
was under fire from the heights, and the artillery, backed against the 
hills and not positioned to defend the camp, were compelled to withdraw 
50 
along with the other elements of the col~fllfl· 
The fight raged well into the afternoon as the Boers progressively 
advanced on the camp and the British gradually gave way to their numer-
ical advantage. Finally, the British assumed a defensive posture on a 
hillock about 3,000 yards from the original camp and the Boers ceased 
their advance, apparently unwilling to accept the punishment of as-
saulting an entrencqecl defensive position. The British took advantage 
of the opportunity to retreat from the area, and leaving their four 
12-pounder field guns and a small escort element to fight a precarious 
rear guard action, the remainder of the column withdrew from the area, 
Late in the evening, the rear guard rejoined the retreating column and 
by the next morning t~e British were twenty-three miles from the scene 
51 
of the tra~~Y· Poor local security and poor deployment of :fotces 
had cost the British dearly, and the retreating column had been 
diminished by nearly half its number, losing eighty-eight killed, 172 
. . 52 
wounded and 342 missing or captur~~. 
50Inglefield, pp. 511-512. 
51Ibid., pp. 513-517. 
52 Amery, Vol. 7, App. III, p. 24. 
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The Boers were not infallible either, and they suffered setbacks 
as well. On December 14, a British column surprised 400 Boers en-
camped in the Thabanchu Mountains. Later on January 29, 1901 French 
managed to engage a Boer column estimated at 2,000 men at Boschmans Kop. 
Employing the usual flanking maneuver in conjunction with a heavy bom-
bardment by his five artillery pieces, French caused the Boer positiorl 
to become untenable. Rather than suffer encirclement and bombardment, 
the Boers beat a hasty retreat. Unfortunately, French's maneuver 
failed to intercept the retreating Boers and the British were left 
. h h . . d d · · 53 wit t e position an no ecisive engagem~nt. 
For the Royal Regiment the guerrilla war brought about diminish-
ing participation in the conflict. In late 1900, the Royal Horse and 
Royal Field Artillery batters were split into two and four gun sub= 
divisions. They along with either a 5-inch howitzer or one large 
caliber oxen drawn heavy gun joined the British mounted columns chas-
ing the Boers. By 1901, however, the presence of field guns was de-
mantled less and less, as the British began adopting series of for-
tresses or blockhouses on commanding terrain in an effort to control 
the movements of the Boerso The Boers had also begun abandoning their 
own artillery pieces and large wagons, thereby affording them more 
speed in their movement. Finally Kitchener turned to his Royal Horse 
and Royal Field Artillery and converted them into mounted rifleso The 
gunners exchanged their field guns for rifles, and joined the columns 
54 
of mounted riflers chasing and coralling the Bo~r~. 
53 French, pp. 58-59. 
54J. F. I. H. Doyle, "Our Mounted Rifles, 11 Proceedings of the Royal 
Artillery Institution, XXIX (1903), P• 340. 
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rhe Boer War, like any war, was filled with hundreds of engage-
ments, but those that have been covered vividly illustrated that the 
Royal Regiment had epitomized the fundamental necessity of adaptability 
during the protracted-and guerrilla phases of the war. Mobility, 
d:i,versity and flexibility had clearly been demonstrated. 
At Paardeberg, mobility had trapped and ended the war for Piet 
Cronje. Even though the bombardment of the laager could have been 
more efficiently conducted, the variety of weapons available to the 
commander illustrated a willingness on the part of the Regiment to 
comply with any demand placed on it. 
Buller's activities in relief of Ladysmith had vividly portrayed 
not only the efficient employment of a variety of weapons, but also 
a greater understanding of the capabilities of the arm. The ability 
of the artillery to maintain the pace with the rapid advance of 
Roberts' army in the punishing march to Pretoria was surpassed only 
by the infantry, who had to walk the entire distance. 
The Royal Regiment displayed a diversity of weapons, particularly 
heavy guns, during the second phase of the war, and they were in con-
tinued use even during the guerrilla war. Dismantling siege guns 
and coastal artillery pieces, the Regiment placed them on improvised 
mo-untings that gave them sufficient mobility to join the mobile army 
and become an integral part of the success that followed. 
For the gunners themselves, their courage was once again unsur-
passed, as exemplified by their conduct at the Sanna' s Post tragedy. 
Courage, diversity, mobility and adaptability were the hallmarks of 
the Royal Regiment, and it was only fitting that at the end of the war 
the gunners found themselves functioning as mounted infantry as well, 
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thereby completing the circle of adaptability. By some standards the 
Regiment was the 11 best branch of the combatant . ,,ss service. To the 
Boers the Regiment indicated the losses at Paardeberg, Abraham's Kraal, 
Pieters Hill and finally Bergendal. In each engagement, two of which 
were the decisive battles in both theaters of the war, and in many 
others too ntimerous to mention, the Roya 1 Regiment's guns had played 
not only a decisive but a dominant part in the Boer defeats. 
With the war degenerating into a guerrilla conflict and its 
ultimate end in 1902, the.Royal Regiment and the British Army as a 
whole began drawing conclusions from the experience. The lessons 
taught on the veldt and in the kopjes of South Africa required assimi-
lation and application to the future. The impact of smokeless powder, 
camouflage, reconnaissance and long range guns had to be brought into 
focus along with other experiences from other wars, and decisions con-
cerning employment, weaponry and tactics had to be made. 
Certain conclusions were already explicit. Obviously, engagement 
ranges were only limited by observation distances and weapon capabili1-
ties. The employment of camouflage and weapons using smokless powder 
not only restricted observation, but also deceived the enemy and ere-
ated confusion. Cover protected personnel and weapons so they might 
fight another day. The consistent failure of Boer artillery pro-
jectiles to detonate had saved many British lives, but additionally for 
the British, it pointed to the necessity of obtaining dependable fuses 
and projectiles, as well as improving range capabilities of artillery 
55u. s. War Department, Adjutant General's Office, "Extracts from 
the Repor~s of Captain S. L'H. Slocum, Eighth Cavalry, on Operations of 
the British Army," Reports of Military Operations in South Africa and 
China, 1901, p. 80. 
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weapons. Moreover, the war had demonstrated the complexities of 
future wars. Communication, supply and the various types of support 
weapons used by the artillery were demonstrative of the complications 
future wars might hold. Clearly, for the Royal Regiment, long range 
high-powered guns, high trajectory shorter ranged howitzers, and rapid 
fire high velocity field guns had all made a place for themselves on 
the battlefield of the twentieth century. Subsequently, it fell to 
the Regiment to assess their experiences in South Africa, and apply 
them to the future needs of the British Army. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Historically, most wars that have been fought yielded some broad 
lessons for application to future confrontations. The Boer War was no 
different in that aspect, and the feature of overwhelming importance 
and which made the greatest impression upon warfare as a whole, was 
smokless powder. Although it had been in existence for a number of 
years, its full impact was not totally appreciated until the Boer War 
vividly demonstrated its importance. As a tool of warfare, smokeless 
powder complicated the battlefield by creating on the one hand an 
environment which was both psychologically and physically insecure. 
It, coupled with camouflage and long range magazine fed rifles added 
new dimension to surprise as a principle of successful combat. Con-
versely, it demanded a more thorough reconnaissance to locate an enemy 
and eliminate the possibility of being surprised. Secondarily, smoke-
less powder employed with adequate cover protected soldiers and there-
fore contributed to extending survival rates on the battlefield and 
boosting morale and confidence. Clearly, the influence of smokeless 
powder was lasting, and it has since affected warfare in the twentieth 
century markedly. For the Royal Regiment of Artillery irrunediately after 
the war, the broad impact of smokeless powder did not go unnoticed, but 
with it came additional and more specific considerations that resulted 
in modification in employment ideas, as well as new thoughts regarding 
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armament for the Regiment. 
As has often been the case after a war some suggestions were too 
quickly formulated and failed to carry with them the broader appli-
cations of the lessons of the Boer War. Most of these took the Boer 
War as an example of the future of warfare. However, as has been 
pointed out in this study, the terrain and climatic conditions in 
South Africa were unique and not generally the type of conditions that 
would prevail in a European conflict. 
Among those to voice early opinions concerning the war was Winston 
s. Churchill, who obtained a rather folk-hero image for his derring-do 
as a war correspondent in South Africa. Addressing the Royal United 
Service Institution in April, 1901, Churchill pointed out that the 
Boers had employed guns singly or in groups of two or three with some 
efficiency. He went further to suggest that the Royal Regiment should 
adopt a similar tactic by creating what he termed "artillery snipers." 
He visualized their employment as independent of batteries, function-
ing with advanced cavalry for the purpose of harassing the enemy in 
1 his rear ~reis• Obviously, the scope of this suggestion was too 
narrow to be considered an end in itself. Churchill, however, recog-
nized the complications created by the adoption of widely dispersed 
elements on the battlefield in South Africa. He appreciated the diffi-
culties in concentration of fire that this kind of warfare generated. 
Noting the impractical and time consuming work required to move a 
number of weapons so all their fires could be brought on a specific 
1winston S. Churchill, 11 Some Impressions of the War in South 
Africa, 11 The Royal United Service Institution Journal, XLV ( 1901), 
p. 839. 
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target, he suggested a system of colored shells to mark particular 
targets for all guns to engage. It was a novel idea, because heliograph 
communication in South Africa had proved itself less than adequate as 
a means of communication. Churchi 11 himself understood the novelty of 
his suggestions, and describing artillerymen as "grave people," he con-
ceded that._they had not received his suggestions with "exuberant en-
. 2 thus1a Sfll." 
: 
Another voice of suggestion was found in the person of B. F. s. 
Baden-Powell, an officer in the Scots Guards during the Boer War and 
brother of the hero of Mafeking. He pointed out among other things, 
that the uniqueness of the South African theater was conducive to the 
use of long range guns. Specifically regarding artillery, he des-
cribed its effects on the one hand as having "considerable morale in-
fluence," but cont.radicted himself by noting that too much was made 
of that aspect, calling the effect 11 disappointing. 113 The only ad-
vantage found in artillery, according to Baden-Powell, was the fact 
that it had longer ranges than individual weapons. However, Baden-
Powell did see into the future of warfare to some degree, and favored 
engagement by indirect fire with howitzers as a probable important 
asset, allowing the infantry to advance under an umbrella of fire. 4 
Long range fire in the Boer War, clearly made a considerable 
2 . Ibid., 840-841. The colored shell technique to mark targets has 
been adopted since Churchill spoke. It met with some approval in 
World War II, Korea and either it or white phosphorous shell has been 
used extensively in Vietnam as a target marker. 
3 B. F. S. Baden-Powell, War in Practice~ Some Tactical and other 
Lessons of the Campaign in SouthAftica, 1899-1902(London: Iskister 
and Company~imited, 1903), pp. 51, 251. 
4Ibid., pp. 253-255. 
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impression upon most military people; however, long range fire was 
not new. Siege guns had always been longer ranged than field guns, 
but the idea that long range guns on a mobile battlefield could be 
effective had not been appreciated. The Royal Commission appointed to 
investigate the war preparations of the British Army clearly pointed 
to this fact by noting, "it does not appear to have occurred to anyone 
before the war that the Boers could or would, bring the heavy fortress 
guns •••• into action in the field. 115 As illustrated, this new feature 
caused the British to deploy in South Africa a number of various long 
range guns mounted on improvised carriages. With various sorts of 
draught to pull the big guns, including oxen, horses and mules, the 
6 big guns were capable of keeping pace with the fast moving ,r~y. 
The presence of the big guns with their adequate mobility brought 
about questions concerning organization of the Royal Regiment. For 
example, totally ignoring the presence of howitzers and their influ-
ence on the battlefield, General J. Wolfe Murray advocated horse 
artillery with light weapons to accompany mounted forces and field 
artillery with heavy guns to accompany the slower moving infantry 
7 force. General Murray was not alone in his idea, however. General 
Ian Hamilton expressed the view that artillery in the Boer War was un-
5Great Britain, Reports of His Maj esty 1 s Commissioners, p. 91. 
6owen James, "The Elswick Battery in South Africa, 11 .TheRoyal 
United Service Institution Journal, XLV (1901), pp. 993-997. the 
6-inch Elswick naval guns were sighted to e,OOO yards and employing 
oxen, mules and horses as the situation dictated, they spent most 
of their time with French's cavalry, which was noted for its speed 
and mobility. The Elswick guns probably epitomized mobility of big 
guns, since they always kept pace with French. 
7 J. Wolfe Murray, "Do We Require Field Artillery?" Proceedings 
of~ Royal Artillery Institution, XXIX (1903), pp. 217-219. 
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necessarily mobile and advocated a light gun for the Horse Artillery and 
. 8 position artillery to accompany the 1nfantfY• 
Another idea advocated grouping light guns, howitzers and heavy 
guns in a single unit, thereby giving the battery commander a variety 
9 
of weapons to engage any targn?t. Less compulsive thinkers were at 
hand, however, and in the end their ideas prevailed. 
There was no doubt that long range field guns were an absolute 
necessity, but the importance of close responsive fire support did not 
go unnoticed. In 1903, General G. H. Marshall, who had been general 
officer commanding the artillery in South Africa, advised that the 
15-pounder field gun was going to be replaced by a proposed 18-pounder 
quick-firing gun, with a shrapnel range of 6,000 yards, and the 12-
pounder Horse Artillery gun was going to be replaced by a 12~-pounder 
quick-firing gun that possessed equal range and shrapnel effect. More-
over, Marshall recommended that guns employed in the future be con-
fined to four types: "a field artillery gun, a horse artillery gun, 
10 
a field artillery howitzer and a heavy battery gun. 11 This sugges-
tion not only gave variety of response to the commander, but simpli-
fied supply and logistical requirement13.ll 
Following this line of thought, the Royal Regiment retained Horse 
and Field Artillery, and in the summer of 1903, formed a brigade-
8 Great Britain, Reports of His Majesty's Commissioners, p. 920 
9w. P. Sa1,1nders, "Do We Require Field Arti llery? 11 Proceedings 
~ the Royal Artillery Institution, XXIX (1903), pp. 355-356. 
lOG · · f H · . ' 92 93 reat Br1ta1n, Reports.£..__ is MaJesty's Commissioners, p. - • 
11Ibid., p. 89. The British employed three calibers of howitzer 
and seven types of field and heavy guns during the South African 
War, and supplying ammunition was a herculean task. 
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division of heavy artillery to train and operate with the mobile 
12 
army. The weapon chosen for the new heavy artillery was the 4.7 inch 
gun towed by draught horses four abre-st. 13 
Additionally, by 1904 the army decided to maintain in peacetime 
an experimental army corps under a specific commander, General John 
14 French, who would train the unit in peace and command it in ya:f. 
This decision complemented the decision made in 1901 by the Royal Regi-
ment to retain the brigade-division organization in peacetime as well 
15 
as war. Thus, mythical organizations were eliminated and employment 
was facilitated. The brigade-division commander became a member of 
the division commander's staff as well as functioning as the overall 
commander and coordinator of the division's artillery assets. 
The question of armament after the Boer War was never absolutely 
answered, and prevails even today. It was apparent that the 15-pounder 
and 12-pounder would eventually give way to quick-firing guns, just as 
muzzle loaders had given way to breech loaders. However, there were 
many weapons to choose from, and each one had some important feature 
to recorrunend its adoption. 
Krupp and Ehrhardt manufactured field weapons with a low muzzle 
velocity which reduced wear, while the French Army 1 s gun had a higher 
. . 16 
muzzle velocity, and was heavier than the other two ~~n~. Krupp 
12 Inglefield, p. 521. 
13 Callwell and Headlam, p. 67. 
14 French, p. 101. 
15 Callwell and Headlam, pp. 27-28. 
16 H. S. Bethell, "The Field Gun of 1904," Proceedings of the Royal 
Artillery Institution, XXX (1904), pp. 397-398. -----. 
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weapons had proven themselves more stable at the Swiss gun trials 
17 than any other weapons tested. All new weapons were equipped with 
elevating gears or screws to aid in obtaining the maximum range, and 




Ammunition and fuses were equally a concern. Shrapnel had prove~ 
effective within the range limits of its fuse and shell velocity, but 
lyddite had demonstrated less satisfactory results. Newer developments 
in shrapnel shell had been made, however. Ehrhardt, for instance, had 
devised a driving charge rather than a bursting charge for the shell. 
The charge imparted 350 foot/seconds velocity to the shrapnel bullets 
beyond that which the flight velocity of the projectile contributed 
to the round. High explosive ammunition, giving better results than 
lyddite was sought after, but continued to baffle weapon technicians 
19 for many years to come. Fuses for artillery shells were being de-
veloped that were both dependable, a trait British fuses consistently 
displayed in the war, as well as possessing a longer time increment, 
20 
a notable shortcoming of the British shrapn~l fuse. 
Tactics of employment for all artillery in the Boer War were 
affected as well, but not as markedly as one would expect. The 
tactical dictum concerning the artillery duel had not been disproved, 
primarily because the Boers had refused to engage in a duel. The Boer 
17 rbid., p. 398. 
18 rbid., p. 400. 
19rbid., PP• 410-411. 
20rbid., ~p. 411. 
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War did prove, however, that the effect of the artillery preparation 
had been overrated unless, as had been demonstrated at Pieters Hill 
and Monte Cristo, the bombardment was conducted in conjunction with a 
well-coordinated attack. 
More vividly apparent to the gunners was the importance of invisi-
bility and cover. Obviously staying under cover and remaining invisible 
demanded the employment of guns in an indirect method of engagement. 
This involved many other aspects of firing that complicated the science 
of gunnery. With longer ranges available in field guns and taking ad-
vantage of cover, the requirement for observation parties arose and 
21 
with it a problem of communication~. 
Along with longer ranges, observation parties, communication re-
quirements, and dispersion, fire control systems such as mathematical 
tables and slide rules to bring all available fires upon a given tar-
. . . d 22 get at a given time was require. 
The flash and colorful tradition of coming into close contact with 
23 
the enemy continued to appeal to som~. Others, however, saw a differ-
ent employment and discounted the effectiveness of close contact 
suggesting that, 
21A. H~ G~tdon, "Has the Experience of the War in South Africa 
Shown that any Change is Necessary in the System of Field Artillery 
Fire Tactics (in the Attack as Well as in the Defense) in European War-
fare," Proceedings ~ the Royal Artillery Institution, XXIX (1903), 
p. 126. 
22 . Ibid,, pp. 124-125. 
23 . J.P. DuCane, "Some Problems Presented by the Introduction of 
Q. F. Guns for Field Artillery, 11 Proceedin_gs of the Royal Artillery 
Institution, XXX (1904), p. 253, 11While positions behind the cr~st 
will in future be forced on Artillery in opeh stages of the fight it is 
inevitaple that the force of circumstances will equally surely bring 
the gun$ into the open as the fight progre~s~s. 11 
I 
our infantry are shrewd enough to know that shells screaming 
over their heads are a more practical support than the sound 
of batteries struggling with half wrecked teams to get a few 
guns into action close to them, at any unknown range and 
only to draw the whole of the enemy's fire at one sp.ot.24 
The Royal Regiment considered other things such as shields for 
guns, weight of guns, wheel s{ze for easier movement, horses for 
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draught~ optical equipment to aid reconnaissance and target acquisition, 
the future of the automobile in warfare, and the importance of invisi-
bility of their own guns. All these and numerous other issues were 
carefully examined in the immediate aftermath of the Boer War. None 
were immediately settled, but the experience of the Boer War had 
caused the Regiment and the British Army to begin changing to meet the 
derna~ds of the future. Newer, more realistic training was developed, 
and newer weapons were proposed. A.command structure on a permanent 
basis was established. In the final analysis the Regiment began look-
ing forward, preparing itself for the next war that undoubtedly would 
come. The Boer War had shoved the Regiment out of the past, and it 
had happened none too soon. The lessons of the Boer War and those of 
the Russo-Japanese War ( 1904-1905) laid the foundation of the Army 
and Regiment in World War I. It proved to be gigantic compared to 
the Boer War, and the demands placed on the Regiment were proportion-
ately increa.sed, with the lessons of World War I being applied to pre-
pared for yet another confrontation. 
24 • Gordon, p. 134. 
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fontein as well as the movement to Paardeberg Drift. Additionally, 
.tihe article contains information concerning the leadership and 
decisions _of the Boer Generals DeBeer and Cronje. 
Saunders, w. P. "Do We Require Field Artillery?" Proceedings _of the 
Royal Artillery Institution. XXIX (1903); pp. 355-356. 
In light of the lessons of the Boer War and the employment 
of artillery in the conflict, this article concludes that Field 
Artillery is necessary providing it is armed properly. 
"The Boer War in South Africa." Journal of the Military Service 
Institution of the United States. XXVI-ri'900), pp. 49-~7. 
This articI;-reports in detail the engagements in the Boer 
War from Talana Hill to Modder River. 
The Times, January, 1899-January, 1902. 
~-~The Boer War was widely covered by war correspondents from 
throughout the world, and the Times coverage of the build-up of 
the crisis and the engagement$""""a"f"the war is both timely and 
accurately d~tiiled. ' 
Wilson, c. Holmes. "The War: The Artillery at Colenso." Journal of 
the United States Artillery. XIII (1900), pp. 191-197. 
An excellent description of the battle at Colenso and the 
artillery employed by both belligerents makes this article 
indispensable. 1 
"Tactics: With the Artillery in Natal." Journal 
of the United States Artillery. XV (1901), pp. 198-201. 
Wilson's description of the defensive lines at Monte Cristo 
and Pieters Hill, and the important details concerning the 
artillery employment at these two battles causes this article 
to be of utmost importance to the study. 
Wisser, J. P. "The Second Boer War.II Journal of the United States 
Artillery. XIII (1900), pp. 252-271, XIV (1900), PP• 19-5~, 
:•; 
133 ... 176, 264-303, XV (1901), pp. 22-40, 153-174. 
This account of the Boer War from its ~eginnings to the 
engagement at Bergendal by an American observer in South Africa 
provides excellent details of numerous engagements, but it is 
more important for its strategic conclusion~ from the war. 
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